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INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 2005, almost exactly a month after Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall, the mayor of New Orleans convened a group of 
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civic leaders to begin the process of rebuilding the city.1 The civic leaders, 
known as the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (“BNOB”), faced a 
staggering task: 80% of the city had been under a toxic soup of floodwater 
in the wake of the storm, and the Corps of Engineers had finished pumping 
it out only a week earlier.2 The city government was in disarray. None of 
the major functions associated with urban life in modern America was 
operating normally.3 Vast swaths of the city had no electricity or drinking 
water, and the police force was in shambles.4 Order was being maintained 
by the National Guard, and with the city jail flooded, prisoners were being 
held in makeshift cages made of chain-link fences and razor wire built 
inside the city’s Amtrak station.5 The bodies of those killed in the storm 
were still largely unaccounted for.6 
Behind the immediate chaos, a broader question loomed: how should 
the city rebuild? In the months following the storm, a study conducted by 
the RAND Corporation at the request of the BNOB estimated that the parts 
of the city that had been under more than four feet of water would regain 
no more than 30% of their population within three years.7 Foreseeing 
sparsely populated neighborhoods heavily sprinkled with abandoned, 
rotting houses, most experts believed that attempting to maintain the city’s 
original footprint with only a fraction of its population was a recipe for 
disaster.8 Meanwhile, the intense devastation meted out on the city 
highlighted what appeared at the time to be an unavoidable truth: many of 
the city’s neighborhoods sat well below sea level and thus would never be 
truly safe.9 The only way to keep New Orleanians out of harm’s way for 
the indefinite future, it seemed, was to move them to higher ground.  
To address this issue, the BNOB called in a set of experts: a panel of 
urban planning professionals from around the country affiliated with the 
                                                                                                             
 1. GARY RIVLIN, KATRINA: AFTER THE FLOOD 158 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 124–26. 
 3. Id. at 159–61. 
 4. Id. at 122. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 123, 126–27. 
 7. KEVIN MCCARTHY ET AL., RAND GULF STATES POL’Y INST., THE 
REPOPULATION OF NEW ORLEANS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 27 (2006), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR36 
9.pdf [https://perma.cc/P34P-M7J6]. 
 8. See Richard Campanella, Delta Urbanism and New Orleans: After, 
PLACES J. (Apr. 2010), https://placesjournal.org/article/delta-urbanism-and-new-
orleans-after/ [https://perma.cc/U32Q-RM7B]. 
 9. Timothy M. Kusky, Time to move to higher ground, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 
25, 2005), http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles 
/2005/09/25/time_to_move_to_higher_ground/ [https://perma.cc/93GE-86X8]. 
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Urban Land Institute, whose members flew to New Orleans in November 
2005 to conduct a “summit” and come up with a solution to the “footprint 
problem.”10 After a few weeks of study and a handful of public meetings, 
the group released its preliminary findings: a set of the worst-flooded 
neighborhoods in New Orleans, the BNOB argued, should be abandoned 
and allowed to revert to “green space.”11 These determinations eventually 
landed on the front page of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, accompanied 
by a large map depicting the neighborhoods slated for abandonment covered 
by opaque green circles.12  
The “green dot map,” as it came to be known, triggered a political 
firestorm.13 Displaced residents reacted with fury to the idea that they 
would be forbidden from returning to their homes and reconstructing their 
lives, and meetings held after the plan became public were jammed with 
people objecting forcefully to the idea of the city government preventing 
them from rebuilding.14 Within a week, the mayor announced that he 
would oppose the plan’s call for a moratorium on building permits in the 
green dot neighborhoods.15 The BNOB was unceremoniously disbanded, 
                                                                                                             
 10. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 168–69. 
 11. Frank Donze, Don’t Write Us Off, Residents Warn: Urban Land Institute 
Report Takes a Beating, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1. 
 12. Frank Donze & Gordon Russell, 4 Months to Decide: Nagin Panel Says 
Hardest Hit Areas Must Prove Viability; City’s Footprint May Shrink; Full Buyouts 
Proposed for Those Forced to Move; New Housing to Be Developed in Vast Swaths 
of New Orleans’ Higher Ground, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 11, 2006, at A1. 
 13. Richard Campanella, A Katrina Lexicon: How We Talk About a Disaster 
So Monumental We Can’t Agree on What to Call It, PLACES J. (July 2015), 
https://doi.org/10.22269/150727 [hereinafter Campanella, A Katrina Lexicon] 
[https://perma.cc/DG6S-HS9C]; ROBERTA BRANDES GRATZ, WE’RE STILL HERE 
YA BASTARDS: HOW THE PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS REBUILT THEIR CITY 41 
(2015) (noting that the green dot map was “explosive” and “galvanized a potent, 
citywide opposition”). 
 14. See Frank Donze, Let Us Decide on Rebuilding, Residents Say: Don’t 
Stymie Neighborhoods, City Officials Told at Meetings, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 15, 
2006, at B1 [hereinafter Donze, Let Us Decide]; Gordon Russell & Frank Donze, 
Rebuilding Proposal Gets Mixed Reception: Damaged Neighborhoods Must Prove 
Viability; Critics Vocal at Meeting, but Most Content to Watch and Wait, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1. 
 15. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 217. The mayor explained that he was “a property-
rights person” and that he believed that the people of New Orleans could “decide 
intelligently for themselves where they want to rebuild.” Id. He later insisted that 
the city could make no promises in terms of restoring services to the neighborhoods 
in question: “If you go in those areas, God bless you . . . . We’ll try to provide you 
with support as best we can. But understand we’re concentrating city resources in 
the areas that are in the immediate recovery zone.” Id. at 239. 
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and all talk of retreat was off the table.16 New Orleanians would be free to 
rebuild where they saw fit. 
The utter failure of New Orleans’s attempt to enforce retreat from its 
most vulnerable areas is best seen as the opening act in a drama that is 
likely to play out across the United States over the course of the next few 
decades. Although predicting the exact amount of sea level rise the world 
is likely to experience in any particular span of time is impossible, 
conservative estimates project roughly three feet of increase in sea level 
by 2100.17 At least one recent study has suggested that seas could rise by 
several feet within the next 50 years.18 The effects of a several-foot 
increase in sea levels are likely to be dramatic. One study estimated that a 
three foot increase in sea level would displace roughly 4.2 million 
Americans, and a six foot increase would displace 13.1 million Americans.19 
Indeed, the effects of inundation are already beginning to be felt. Routine 
tidal flooding is disrupting life in many coastal communities, closing 
streets, killing plants, polluting water supplies, and making roads 
impassable.20 Inundation caused by rising sea levels is only one aspect of 
                                                                                                             
 16. Richard Campanella, “Bring Your Own Chairs”: Civic Engagement in 
Postdiluvial New Orleans, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE WAKE OF KATRINA 23, 
35 (Amy Koritz & George J. Sanchez eds., 2009) [hereinafter Campanella, “Bring 
Your Own Chairs”]. 
 17. Justin Gillis, Seas Are Rising at Fastest Rate in Last 28 Centuries, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/science/sea-level-
rise-global-warming-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/9Z7F-YZTP]. 
 18. Justin Gillis, Scientists Warn of Perilous Climate Shift Within Decades, 
Not Centuries, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23 
/science/global-warming-sea-level-carbon-dioxide-emissions.html [https://perma 
.cc/2ERJ-JJPQ]. 
 19. Tatiana Schlossberg, Rising Sea Levels May Disrupt Lives of Millions, Study 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/science/ris 
ing-sea-levels-global-warming-climate-change.html (discussing Matthew E. Hauer et 
al., Millions Projected to be at Risk from Sea-level Rise in the Continental United 
States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691 (2016)) [https://perma.cc/RWF4-ZFVM]. 
The study’s authors concluded that coastal inundation could lead to a population 
shift comparable to the “Great Migration” of African-Americans out of the South 
in the 20th century. Id. 
 20. Gillis, Seas Are Rising at Fastest Rate in Last 28 Centuries, supra note 
17 (noting that “increasingly routine” flooding is “making life miserable in places 
like Miami Beach; Charleston, S.C.; and Norfolk, Va., even on sunny days”); 
Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already Begun, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flood 
ing-of-coast-caused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html [https://perma.cc 
/9MA3-5QEW]. 
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the looming flooding problem: climate change is also projected to increase 
the severity of rain storms and hurricanes, worsening catastrophic flooding 
events in inland areas as well as on the coasts.21 
The nation’s ever-increasing flood risk has led to a chorus of calls for 
some form of retreat.22 Observing that policies at all levels of government 
have for nearly a century encouraged coastal development in various ways, 
experts in planning, climate change, and disaster law have argued that 
government now needs to begin the process of moving people away from 
the areas most exposed to flood risk.23 There are a range of legal 
mechanisms available to implement retreat, but for the most part they have 
                                                                                                             
 21. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 9, 37, 40 (Jerry M. 
Melillo, Terese Richmond & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014), nca2014.globalchange.gov 
[https://perma.cc/G2HC-GMTQ]. This problem was vividly illustrated in August 
2016, when rainfall in southern Louisiana caused flooding that killed 13 people and 
displaced tens of thousands. The event was the eighth since May 2015 involving a 
quantity of rainfall statistically rare enough to have only a 0.2 percent chance of 
occurring in any given year (also known as a 500-year flood). Jonah Engel 
Bromwich, Flooding in the South Looks a Lot Like Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/us/climate-change-louisiana 
.html [https://perma.cc/7UFK-BF4R]. 
 22. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat is the 
Best Option: Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change 
Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 696 (2014); ANNE SIDERS, COLUM. LAW 
SCH. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL 
HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS (Oct. 
2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/file s/microsites/climate-
change/files/Publications/Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pd
f [https://perma.cc/U53S-KVS9]; Michael Kimmelman, Going with the Flow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2013, at AR1 (describing a proposal by Governor Cuomo to pay 
residents of flood-prone areas to relocate); J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: 
Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 73 (2012); Lisa A. 
St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for a Peaceful 
Migration, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (describing a strategy of 
“institutionalizing the presumption that humanly-constructed structures will have 
to give way to migrating wetlands as sea level rises”); N. Y. STATE SEA LEVEL RISE 
TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 60 (2010), http://www.dec.ny 
.gov/docs/administration_pdf /slrtffinalrep.pdf (calling for reducing “incentives that 
increase or perpetuate development in high-risk locations” and creating “incentives 
for sustainable adaptation planning,” particularly “adaptive transition of 
infrastructure and development over time”) [https://perma.cc/6PKQ -AJWH]. 
 23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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failed to achieve any meaningful progress.24 Indeed, the nation’s coastal 
counties are still growing in population.25 Perhaps in part because human 
perception of risk is never so keen as when risks have just been realized, 
calls for retreat from particular areas are often strongest in the immediate 
aftermath of disasters, when homes sit empty and the evidence of the risk 
is hard to ignore.26 But as the example of New Orleans shows, the views 
of experts on the wisdom of retreat and the views of the people who live 
in risky locations often diverge, particularly after a storm.27 The consensus 
view in the scholarly and scientific communities on the need to retreat 
from flood-prone areas thus runs up against a problematic obstacle: 
nobody wants to leave.28 
In fact, flood victims’ reactions to disasters are often characterized by 
an intense desire to rebuild that is expressed in heated, adversarial terms.29 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Verchick & Johnson, supra note 22, at 695; Peter Byrne & Jessica 
Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 267, 268 (Michael B. Gerard & Katrina Fischer Kuhn eds., 2012); Lisa 
Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the 
Future of the American City, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2157, 2161 (2011). 
 25. See Hauer et al., supra note 19, at 691; see also Dan Frosch & Cameron 
McWhirter, Houston’s Rapid Growth, Heavy Rains, Heighten Flood Risk, WALL 
ST. J. (May 19, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/houstons-rapid-growth-
heavy-rains-heighten-flood-risk-1463680866 (noting that “[m]any cities in the 
South and along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts have grown faster than other parts 
of the country in recent decades and become much more prone to flooding” and 
that the Houston-Woodlands-Sugarland metropolitan area was the fastest growing 
in the country between 2010 and 2015) [https://perma.cc/7PSR-NQYD]. In 
addition to simply putting more people in flood-prone areas, population growth 
makes flooding worse, as land that is paved over is less able to absorb water. Id. 
(“[W]hen heavy downpours hit, the rain has no place to drain . . . . In the last 15 
years, the amount of impervious surface—mostly pavement—has grown 25% in 
Harris county, which includes Houston . . . .”). 
 26. See, e.g., Kusky, supra note 9. 
 27. Compare id. (discussing the need to potentially relocate in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina), with Donze, Let Us Decide, supra note 14 (discussing New 
Orleans residents’ efforts to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina). 
 28. See Verchick & Johnson, supra note 22, at 695 (“We Americans are more 
interested in fortifying our castles or building them higher than in moving out of 
harm’s way.”).  
 29. Although the focus of this Article is on flood risk, and especially 
hurricanes, the insights offered are to some extent generalizable to certain other 
natural disasters, particularly when the nature of the risks involved is tied to living 
in a certain area or in a certain manner. For instance, wildfires have become more 
common and more destructive in recent years, exacerbated, like floods, both by 
climate change and increasing settlement in certain high-risk areas. See, e.g., Max 
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In the wake of disasters, residents frequently respond not by treating their 
homes as sunk costs and dispassionately reevaluating their decision to live 
in flood-prone areas but by asserting, often angrily, that they will never 
“surrender,”30 that “retreat is not an option,”31 and that they are “stronger 
than the storm.”32 This emotional response to disasters is one of the key 
obstacles standing in the way of the road to more resilient housing patterns, 
and yet it typically is ignored by the community of scholars who study 
disaster law and policy.33 
Although there are a range of cultural, historical, geographical, and 
economic factors that affect the response to any individual storm, as well 
as factors that affect the response of any particular individual, the 
emotional drivers of rebuilding can be illuminated by a set of analogies. 
First, rebuilding can be an act of revenge. Tort theorists have seen in tort 
law a mechanism by which people seek revenge against those who have 
wronged them.34 Similarly, rebuilding is revenge in that it represents a 
victory over the storm that destroyed one’s home. What this accomplishes 
                                                                                                             
A. Moritz & Scott Gabriel Knowles, Coexisting with Fire, 104 AM. SCIENTIST 
220 (2016) (noting that problematic fire suppression policies are fostered by the 
fact that “the primary response is to fight fires rather than accept them as a 
recurring fact of life”). 
 30. Campanella, “Bring Your Own Chairs”, supra note 16, at 28 (showing a 
photograph of large banner hung over the entrance of popular, locally-owned 
barbershop). 
 31. Paul Mulshine, Desert the Jersey Shore? Retreat is Not an Option, STAR-
LEDGER (Feb. 5, 2013, 8:24 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_paul_mulshine/2013/02 
/desert_the_jersey_shore_retrea.html [https://perma.cc/Y322-JVV6]. 
 32. See New Jersey Going Strong, New Jersey: Stronger than the Storm TV 
Commercial, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
QaHQNSGlfTs [https://perma.cc/7AHN-V5KE]. 
 33. To be sure, scholars have noted the difficulty of imposing retreat in the 
wake of disasters and have offered a handful of explanations for this phenomenon 
and policy recommendations aimed at addressing it. See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis, 
supra note 24, at 270 (“Regulators often lack the political will (or authority) to 
prevent redevelopment, especially after a major disaster . . . .”). The issue, however, 
has not been addressed in any real depth. 
 34. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: 
Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 
524, 602 (2005) (“Redress through law, as Locke and Blackstone understood, is 
a substitute for vengeance.”); Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 86, 87 n.11 (John 
Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“[A]n an age-old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a 
substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury.” (quoting Mathias v. Accor 
Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.))); Emily 
Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1397 (2003). 
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is not retribution—inflicting pain on someone who has pained you—but 
expression, a performance in support of a message, a reclaiming of both 
material losses and normative status. 
Second, rebuilding is culture. Although traditional regulatory efforts 
to enforce retreat are premised on a dichotomy between rational and 
irrational responses to risk, there is a growing movement among scholars 
of risk perception to understand many decisions about risk as culturally 
expressive rather than rational or irrational.35 Thus, when people choose 
to rebuild in an area they know is prone to floods, it is possible that in 
doing so they are expressing deep cultural commitments rather than 
behaving irrationally. Because floods impact communities, rebuilding also 
expresses a commitment to community that may well be a fundamental 
aspect of self-identity. 
Third and finally, rebuilding can be an act of resistance. Flood risk is 
disproportionately concentrated in low-income, minority communities.36 
When floods occur, those same communities often lack the resources to 
avoid their worst effects, making many storms vivid illustrations of societal 
inequalities.37 For many of its victims, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that 
the government regarded them as not worthy of protection.38 Although 
rebuilding in these cases might be a way of countering this message, a 
prohibition on rebuilding only makes that message stronger. By trying to 
enforce retreat in the wake of floods that have disparate impacts, governments 
appear to signal their desire to rid themselves of particular groups entirely. 
Rebuilding thus becomes an act of political resistance, a way of avoiding 
being erased and getting even with wealthier, drier communities. 
Understanding the expressive aspects of recovery helps show why efforts 
to prevent rebuilding in the wake of storms have failed so spectacularly. If 
rebuilding contains elements of revenge, expresses cultural commitments 
about risk, helps reinforce a sense of identity, and provides a form of 
resistance against unequal treatment, then society may have more success 
using traditional regulatory tools to enforce retreat if it also makes 
meaningful efforts to address the emotional significance of rebuilding. 
                                                                                                             
 35. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 745 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan, Two Conceptions]; 
Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun 
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 
EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural 
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental 
Equity in New Orleans, 1890-1930, 28 J. OF HIST. GEOGRAPHY 237, 237 (2002). 
 37. See infra notes 190–195 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 200–204 and accompanying text. 
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This Article begins the process of thinking through what those 
measures might look like—the ways in which some form of repair might 
be offered to those who are prevented from pursuing their own private 
form of recovery. Part I discusses the problem of retreat from flood-prone 
areas and reviews the array of legal mechanisms that have been put 
forward as ways of encouraging it, with particular emphasis on the call to 
abandon certain areas in the wake of floods. Part II presents a set of 
analogies that help explain the intense desire to rebuild after floods. These 
observations lead to new insights about what rebuilding accomplishes and 
why forbidding it has proven to be so difficult. Part III considers some of 
the ways in which the desire to rebuild might be satisfied, at least partially, 
without moving people back into harm’s way. 
I. ADVANCE AND RETREAT 
Americans have spent much of the past century enthusiastically 
populating low-lying, flood-prone areas.39 Federal policies have for 
decades contributed to this problem. First, large-scale engineering projects 
aimed at preventing flooding from rivers and oceans have attracted 
development to what would otherwise be uninhabitable land, land that 
often ends up flooded anyway.40 In addition to attracting people to risky 
areas, flood control projects can also make flooding itself worse in a 
variety of complex ways. When the banks of rivers are armored with 
levees to prevent flooding, water that might naturally spread out and slow 
                                                                                                             
 39. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of 
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for 
Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SCI. 171, 173–76 
(2006); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program 
and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62–63, 66 (1985). 
 40. New Orleans East, a vast suburban neighborhood that before Hurricane 
Katrina was the home of much of the city’s black middle class, is a stark example. 
The area sits well below sea level and was an empty swamp until after Hurricane 
Betsy, which sparked the development of a comprehensive levee system 
surrounding New Orleans. By including the empty swamp that became New 
Orleans East within the levee system, the federal government was able to add the 
economic boon enjoyed by developers to its cost-benefit analysis, substantially 
reducing the apparent burden of the project. Forty years later, the neighborhood 
was under eight feet of water and 68 of its residents were dead. Sebastian N. 
Jonkman et al., Loss of Life Caused by the Flooding of New Orleans After 
Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Relationship Between Flood Characteristics 
and Mortality, 29 RISK ANALYSIS 676, 690 (2009). Notably, this figure includes 
only bodies located in the neighborhood, not residents of the neighborhood who 
died in facilities like hospitals and shelters. Id. 
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down in a floodplain is forced downriver, increasing the risk of floods in 
other areas.41 Preventing seasonal flooding also deprives coastal deltas of 
their source of silt, which accelerates subsidence and erosion and thus 
increases the risk of flooding from the sea.42 Coastal armoring projects 
also risk worsening the flooding they are built to prevent. Rigid concrete 
walls designed to prevent the erosion of sandy beaches have actually 
accelerated this process by changing the way in which waves pick up and 
deposit sand.43 
Federally subsidized flood insurance has attracted people to flood-
prone areas for half a century. Because flood risk is costly, difficult to 
measure, and highly correlated,44 private insurers had essentially stopped 
issuing flood insurance by the middle of the Twentieth century. In 
response, the federal government created the National Flood Insurance 
Program (“NFIP”), which provides flood insurance and requires that 
participating communities enact building codes that help make flood-
prone areas more resistant to flood damage.45 The problem is that a 
substantial portion of policyholders have always been charged rates that 
are significantly below levels that reflect the true “actuarial” risk they 
face.46 Artificially cheap flood insurance partially socializes the costs of 
flooding and signals to homeowners that the risk they face is lower than it 
actually is. 
                                                                                                             
 41. Houck, supra note 39, at 81. 
 42. Robert Giegengack & Kenneth R. Foster, Physical Constraints on 
Reconstructing New Orleans, in REBUILDING URBAN PLACES AFTER DISASTER: 
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 13, 21–23, 26 (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan 
M. Wacther eds., 2006). 
 43. See ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE DIXON WHEELER, THE CORPS AND 
THE SHORE 1–5 (Island Press 1998). 
 44. “Correlation” in the context of insurance refers to the likelihood that a 
given risk will be realized by multiple policyholders at the same time. The chance 
of an individual dying of a heart attack is unrelated to the chance of his neighbor 
dying of a heart attack; the chance of a home flooding is highly correlated with 
the chance of its neighbor flooding at the same time. See James Ming Chen, 
Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The Contours of Financial 
Preparedness for Disaster, 26 FORDHAM ENVT’L L. REV. 56, 65–66 (2014) 
(referring to correlation as “the most insidious factor undermining the financial 
integrity of private insurance for catastrophic risk”). 
 45. See The National Flood Insurance Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4081. 
 46. As of 2010, the GAO estimated that about 22% of NFIP policyholders 
paid subsidized rates. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-631T, 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES 6 (2010). 
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The most dramatic way the government has socialized flood risk—and 
thereby encouraged people to live in flood-prone areas—is by allocating 
massive aid packages in the wake of disasters.47 The Stafford Act allows 
state governors to request that the President issue a “major disaster” 
declaration, which allows the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”) to provide federal assistance to state recovery efforts from the 
agency’s Disaster Relief Fund.48 The Stafford Act’s definition of “major 
disaster” is extremely broad and has led to federal assistance for seemingly 
routine events like snowstorms.49 There are a handful of modern reform 
proposals aimed at reducing the amount of federal disaster relief by 
changing things like the accounting mechanics of the Disaster Relief Fund 
or the formula used by FEMA to determine when a disaster overwhelms 
state resources such that federal assistance is necessary.50 Such efforts, 
however, seem unlikely to meaningfully reduce congressional willingness 
to provide funding whenever disaster strikes.51 
The result of these policies, and the general modern taste for coastal 
living,52 is a dangerous concentration of people, homes, businesses, and 
                                                                                                             
 47. Less than two weeks after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Congress 
allocated $51.8 billion in aid, by overwhelming margins. Peter Baker & Amy 
Goldstein, Congress Approves $51.8 Billion for Victims, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 
2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/09/09/congress-
approves-518-billion-for-victims/25a2e6e2-4abf-4475-b617-e9e13895a105/?utm  
_term=.85d6c98b916b [https://perma.cc/6F8T-G9LG]. That appropriation was 
merely the first in a series of allocations, which eventually amounted to about $120 
billion in aid. BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43537, FEMA’S 
DISASTER RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 13 (2014). The total 
amount of federal funds allocated after Hurricane Sandy was roughly $60 billion. 
Lindsay, supra, at 13. 
 48. LINDSAY, supra note 47, at 2–3. 
 49. Id. at 16. 
 50. Id. at 13–18. 
 51. The federal government has been remarkably solicitous of the needs of 
disaster victims for as long as there has been a federal government. See Michele 
L. Landis, Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’: Disaster Relief and the Origins 
of the Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 973–1034 (1998). 
 52. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition 
of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 295, 309–
10 (2003) (describing various factors making coastal living appealing). Barnhizer 
also notes that a boom in coastal development from the 1970s to the 1990s 
coincided with a lull in hurricane activity, making coastal investments appear 
safer than they actually are. Id. at 310; see also Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-
Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE 
KATRINA 153, 160 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard Kunreuther 
eds., 2006) (noting that between 1887 and 1969, hurricanes hit South Florida at 
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infrastructure in risky, flood-prone areas. A 2013 study commissioned by 
FEMA estimated that increasingly intense rainstorms and sea level rise 
would lead to dramatic increases in the size of flood zones along coasts 
and rivers and in the average losses per flood insurance policy.53 Estimates 
of the cost of this increased flooding are by necessity rough, but they are 
nonetheless alarming. A recent study estimated that at current rates of sea 
level rise, as much as $507 billion worth of existing coastal property will 
be underwater by 2100.54 Estimates based on more recent, more dire 
predictions of six feet of sea level rise over the next century put those 
figures much higher: $882 billion, according to the real estate website 
Zillow, which based its figure on maps released by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration.55 At six feet of sea level rise, almost 300 
American cities would lose at least half their homes, and 36 cities would 
be completely lost.56 
                                                                                                             
an average rate of one every three years, but between 1970 and 1992, the region 
was hit by only two and saw an explosion in coastal development). 
 53. Becky Hayat & Robert Moore, Natural Res. Def. Council, Addressing 
Affordability and Long-Term Resiliency Through the National Flood Insurance 
Program, 45 ENVT’L L. REP. 10338, 10339–40 (2015). High-risk flood areas 
along rivers would increase in size by 45% by 2100, leading to an increase in the 
number of policyholders along rivers of 80% over the same period. The equivalent 
figures for coastal areas are a 55% increase in flood zones, causing a 130% 
increase in policyholders. Id. The study also estimated a 90% increase in the 
average loss cost per policy. Id. 
 54. KATE GORDON ET AL., RISKY BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2014), http://riskybusiness.org/site 
/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/3XJ9-HWM7]. The study also estimated that there is a five percent chance 
that $701 billion worth of existing coastal property would be below mean sea 
levels by 2100. Id. 
 55. Krishna Rao, Climate Change and Housing: Will a Rising Tide Sink all 
Homes?, ZILLOW (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.zillow.com/research/climate-
change-underwater-homes-12890/ [https://perma.cc/58C5-SVE6]. Notably, this 
figure does not include damage to public infrastructure or commercial real estate, 
nor does it factor in estimated increases in the population of coastal counties over 
the same period, which currently range from 50% to 144%. Rob Moore, Five 
Climate-Smart Actions to Reform Flood Insurance, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL 
(Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/rob-moore/five-climate-smart-
actions-reform-flood-insurance (discussing Zillow report) [https://perma.cc 
/8YKK-TJTZ]. 
 56. Rao, supra note 55. Notably, 17.8% of Boston’s housing stock would be 
underwater, as would 24.8% of Honolulu’s housing stock and 30.5% of Miami’s 
housing stock. Id. 
2017] STRONGER THAN THE STORM 449 
 
 
 
Although engineering projects might protect major population centers 
from inundation in some cases, they are not likely to present a 
comprehensive solution to the problem of sea level rise. For the reasons 
noted above, flood control projects often end up worsening exposure to 
flood risks in various ways.57 In other cases, the protection they afford is 
simply too expensive58 or involves protecting some people in exchange for 
increasing the risk faced by others, which is a moral calculus that is 
unappealing at best.59 In other areas, most notably Miami, there is 
essentially nothing engineers can do.60 In many cases, the inescapable 
conclusion is that the only way to avoid flooding is to move to higher 
ground.61 
A range of legal mechanisms exist by which governments can foster 
retreat, none of which have been particularly successful. The most 
straightforward approach is for local governments to “downzone” flood-
prone areas, proactively limiting new development on private parcels.62 
Governments can also create setbacks or buffers so that homes built on 
large lots must be situated away from floodplains. Exactions can also be 
                                                                                                             
 57. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Jon Gertner, Should the United States Save Tangier Island from 
Oblivion?, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10 
/magazine/should-the-united-states-save-tangier-island-from-oblivion.html?mcu  
bz=1 (noting that saving a small island in Chesapeake Bay from inundation would 
cost an estimated $30 million to protect a population of 470 people) [https: 
//perma.cc/N4SP-V9F5?safari=1]. 
 59. Hurricane Sandy renewed discussion of whether New York City, like 
London, should construct a flood control barrier across the entrance to its harbor. 
Mireya Navarro, Weighing Sea Barriers as Protection for New York, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2012, at A21. The project was estimated to cost between $10 and $17 
billion and worsen flooding in areas outside its protection by as much as 20%. Id. 
The idea was explicitly rejected in Mayor Bloomberg’s comprehensive plan for 
making the city more resilient in the face of floods. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL 
INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT 
NEW YORK 49 (June 11, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/sir/html/report/re 
port.shtml (discussing downsides of two possible harbor barrier proposals) 
[https://perma.cc/94YF-253X]. 
 60. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Siege of Miami: As Temperatures Climb, So, 
Too, Will Sea Levels, NEW YORKER (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com 
/magazine/2015/12/21/the-siege-of-miami (describing the “intractable” geology 
of South Florida: “Building a dike on porous limestone is like putting a fence on 
top of a tunnel: it alters the route of travel, but not necessarily the amount.”) 
[https://perma.cc/QX63-4CCM]. 
 61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 62. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 272–73. 
450 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
used to secure easements or other commitments from developers in 
exchange for necessary permits.63 These approaches can limit future 
development and prevent redevelopment when structures are damaged.64 
Although such land use decisions and the zoning laws that enforce 
them are the responsibility of local governments, several federal statutes 
encourage local governments to take issues relating to climate change, sea 
level rise, and flooding into account. The Coastal Zone Management Act 
(“CZMA”) encourages states to develop coastal management programs 
and makes them eligible for federal funds if they do so.65 States are 
encouraged, but not required, to take sea level rise into account in 
developing their plans.66 Similarly, the Disaster Mitigation Act (“DMA”) 
encourages states to develop disaster mitigation plans, again in exchange 
for federal funds.67  
The requirements of the NFIP are stronger and more properly 
characterized as substantive. To be eligible to participate in the program—
and thus allow their residents to purchase flood insurance—local 
governments must pass zoning ordinances that mandate certain adaptations 
to mitigate flood risk.68 Chief among these is the requirement that within 
what are known as “100-year flood zones,” new properties and properties 
that are substantially rebuilt after being flooded must be elevated above 
what FEMA determines is a statistically average flood depth—the “base 
flood elevation.”69 In many cases, this requirement can mean elevating a 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 273. 
 64. Id. at 272–73. 
 65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); see also John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation 
Through Land Use Strategies, 37 ENVT’ L. L. REP. 10681, 10686–87 (2007). 
 66. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 272. 
 67. Nolon, supra note 65, at 10683–85; Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. 
Law 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552–1576 (amending chapter 68 of Title 42 of the United 
States Code). These requirements are largely procedural in the sense that the 
DMA does not actually require that states implement their disaster mitigation 
plans, only that they develop them. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 272; see 
also Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical 
Axis, 39 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 390, 408–12 (2014). Kaswan concludes her survey 
of federal activity in this area by noting that federal laws “do not systematically 
require local or state climate assessment, planning, or adaptation measures” and 
that “[f]ederal programs often provide willing state and local governments with 
valuable information and piecemeal funding but do not provide a comprehensive 
or coordinated land-use response.” Id. at 412. 
 68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102(c); 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(3) (2017). 
 69. This is a very broad-brush description of an extremely complex 
regulatory regime. For more detail, see Alexander B. Lemann, Rolling Back the 
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home as much as a dozen feet above the surrounding grade, and when the 
expense makes doing this impractical, these zoning ordinances can force 
people to abandon properties that have been substantially damaged by 
floods.70 The NFIP also requires that homeowners in 100-year flood zones 
with a mortgage from a federally regulated bank carry flood insurance, and 
in some cases the premiums are expensive enough to force people to move 
or to dissuade people from buying flood-prone properties in the first 
place.71  
Still, the NFIP also serves as a vivid illustration of how profoundly 
difficult it is to encourage retreat. When the program was reformed in 2012 
to eliminate certain categories of artificially cheap premiums,72 the 
resulting increase in prices sparked an immediate backlash, leading 
Congress to undo many of its reforms only 20 months after passing them.73 
Although there are certainly instances in which the NFIP’s requirements 
effectively force people out of flood-prone properties, the idea that flood 
insurance should be “affordable” continues to enjoy broad support,74 and 
                                                                                                             
Tide: Toward an Individual Mandate for Flood Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENVT’L. 
L. REV. 166, 182–87 (2015). 
 70. See, e.g., Renee Peck, Elevated Houses Making a Mark on Post-Katrina 
New Orleans Landscape, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 23, 2008), http://blog.nola.com 
/reneepeck/2008/08/elevated_house_making_a_mark_o.html [https://perma.cc/2 
XSN-RJ4R]; Adam Nossiter, Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal at a Time, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/us/national 
special/rebuilding-new-orleans-one-appeal-at-a-time.html [https://perma.cc/V5V 
7-JJX9]. 
 71. See Lemann, supra note 69, at 196–200, 212–13, 212 n.191, 213 n.192. 
 72. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, § 100205, Pub. 
L. No. 112-141, Title II, 126 Stat. 916 (2012); see also Lemann, supra note 69, at 
192–96 (describing reforms enacted by Biggert-Waters). 
 73. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-89, 128 Stat. 1020. 
 74. For example, a bill designed to encourage private insurers to issue flood 
insurance policies—in large part in the hope that such policies would be more 
affordable than those issued by the NFIP—passed the House in April 2016 by a 
vote of 419 to 0. See Flood Insurance Market Parity and Modernization Act, H.R. 
2901, 114th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, Apr. 28, 2016); see 
also 162 CONG. REC. H1952 (2016) (statement by Rep. Ross, the bill’s sponsor, 
emphasizing the need to provide “more affordable consumer options in the flood 
insurance marketplace”). The Senate never voted on the bill. S. 1679, 114th Cong. 
(2015). The bill was re-introduced in both the House and the Senate in 2017. See 
Flood Insurance Market Development Act of 2017, H.R. 1422, S. 563, 115th 
Cong. (2017). As this Article goes to press, the NFIP is again the focus of a reform 
effort, as it is due for reauthorization before the end of 2017. See Thomas Kaplan & 
Mary Williams Walsh, White House Asks Congress for $29 Billion in Hurricane 
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using insurance premiums to encourage retreat in any large-scale way 
appears to be a political non-starter. Even the mechanisms the NFIP 
already employs often fall short. The program’s reliance on the presence 
of a mortgage as the trigger for requiring flood insurance and on banks and 
financial regulators for enforcement means that in many areas surprisingly 
few people are required to maintain flood insurance, and even those who 
are required to have flood insurance often do not.75 
Even when governments decide to use their zoning power to enforce 
retreat, they encounter a more serious obstacle: the Takings Clause of the 
United States Constitution.76 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
the United States Supreme Court held that South Carolina’s Beachfront 
Management Act had effected a taking by preventing the plaintiff from 
constructing any permanent, habitable structure on two beachfront lots.77 
The state law had been enacted in 1988 in response to the problem of 
coastal erosion due to sea level rise, and it expressly sought to accomplish 
“a gradual retreat from the [beach sand dune] system over a forty-year 
period.”78 To that end, the law prohibited new construction on the seaward 
side of a line representing the most landward point of erosion in the 
previous 40 years and subjected areas on the landward side of that line to 
a set of regulations governing the size and setback of new buildings.79 The 
Court held that depriving the plaintiff of all the economic value of his 
                                                                                                             
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yIuaO6 [https://perma.cc/D5G8-
XJ8G]. 
 75. See Lemann, supra note 69, at 196–200 (describing shortcomings of 
NFIP’s lender mandate). In Orleans Parish, which includes the urban areas of the 
city of New Orleans as well as the particularly low-lying and heavily flooded 
suburban area of New Orleans East, only 40% of homeowners had flood insurance 
before Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 199. A related problem is the program’s reliance on 
the “100-year flood” as its statistical fulcrum. Id. at 180–81. Properties located in 
areas that have less than a one percent chance of flooding in any given year are not 
required to carry flood insurance. The recent flooding in Louisiana demonstrated 
the problem with this approach; much of the damage was in areas that had only a 
0.2% or even 0.1% chance of flooding in any given year. See Edward P. Richards, 
Why Was the Louisiana Flood of August 2016 So Severe?, LSU LAW CTR. 
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2016), https://sites.law 
.lsu.edu/coast/2016/08/why-was-the-louisiana-flood-of-august-2016-so-severe/  
[https://perma.cc/W453-ZDR3]. 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 77. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 78. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 275. The state’s first effort to regulate 
coastal development, which included the creation of the South Carolina Coastal 
Council, came in 1977 in response to the federal CZMA. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. 
 79. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 275. 
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property constituted a taking and thus triggered the state’s obligation to 
compensate him.80 Lucas is broadly understood to mean that states cannot 
“baldly prohibit all new development in upland areas judged likely to be 
submerged by future sea-level rise without likely involving the payment 
of compensation.”81 
Lucas suggested one possible solution: a state law that denies a 
property owner all beneficial use of land does not constitute a taking if 
background principles of property and nuisance law would also bar use of 
the property.82 One of those background principles is the public trust 
doctrine, which treats traditional public rights to land as inherent in any 
private title to it.83 Many states recognize a right of public access to tidal 
areas, and in some cases this right extends to dry beaches above high-tide 
lines.84 As sea levels rise, private land thus can become subject to the 
public trust without the state having to effect a taking.85 Innovative forms 
of zoning like rolling easements allow building restrictions to move inland 
as oceans do.86 Still, this approach allows governments to enforce retreat 
only after sea level rise has made it a fait accompli; prohibiting development 
in areas that will be inundated in the future, or are above sea level but 
subject to high risk of flooding during storms, still runs afoul of Lucas.87 
The expense of having to pay compensation is not the only barrier to 
proactive retreat; it is simply unpopular,88 and because of the decentralized 
and intensely local nature of land-use regulation,89 meaningful proactive 
retreat would require an incredible exercise of foresight and self-
abnegation. Many communities in particularly risky locations are 
extremely small and would have to essentially will themselves out of 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.; see also John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers 
Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521, 548–58 (2013).  
 82. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
 83. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 276. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 278–81. 
 87. Id.; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
 88. See Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 349 (“Perhaps more than any other 
obstacle, it is the political opposition to meaningful restrictions on coastal land 
use that limits the effectiveness of attempts to initiate a retreat from coastal 
floodplains.”). 
 89. See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice 
on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 256, 268 (1993) (noting that 
beachfront property owners are “relatively concentrated in a geographic area 
[and] have a clear common interest in protecting [their] community and property” 
and thus will have an increased “ability to act effectively as an interest group”). 
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existence to retreat from the flood risk they face. There are countless 
examples, but Tangier Island in Chesapeake Bay is a good one. After 
decades of slow population decline, the island is currently home to about 
400 people, and it will be virtually underwater by the end of the century.90 
Still, rather than picking up and leaving, the town is lobbying the federal 
government to spend tens of millions of dollars constructing an elaborate 
system of fortifications that will protect it, at least temporarily.91 Even 
state governments have a hard time putting the long-term interests of their 
populations ahead of the intense short-term interests of people who live on 
the coasts.92 
The perennial unpopularity of even purely voluntary buyouts is 
another illustration of the problem. Voluntary public acquisition of flood-
prone properties has the dual benefits of being politically palatable and 
achieving permanent removal of structures from floodplains, leading some 
commentators to hail it as the only floodplain management technique that 
offers a real chance of success.93 Indeed, buyout efforts do have a history 
of achievement, most notably in the wake of the 1993 flooding on the 
Mississippi River, which led to the relocation of two towns.94 Still, buyouts 
are costly in the short term,95 and participation rates are often 
disappointing.96 There are ways in which existing buyout programs could 
                                                                                                             
 90. Gertner, supra note 58. 
 91. See id. 
 92. The experience of the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission is 
a vivid cautionary tale. In 2010, the Commission’s science panel studied the 
problem of sea level rise and concluded that the ocean along the State’s coast 
could rise anywhere from 15 to 55 inches by 2100. It then recommended that the 
State adopt a figure of 39 inches for planning purposes, and the Commission 
drafted a policy ordering coastal counties to use that figure in evaluating private 
development and public infrastructure projects. The backlash was intense. 
Officials in the Outer Banks, which would be virtually erased by 39 inches of sea 
level rise, successfully lobbied state lawmakers to set aside the Commission’s 
forecast and look 30 years into the future instead, estimating only eight inches of 
sea level rise during that time period. See Lori Montgomery, On N.C.’s Outer 
Banks, Scary Climate-Change Predictions Prompt a Change of Forecast, WASH. 
POST (June 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ncs-
outer-banks-got-a-scary-forecast-about-climate-change-so/2014/06/24/0042cf96  
-f6f3-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html [https://perma.cc/5VJN-SF2B]. 
 93. Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 350; Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10344. 
 94. Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 351. For a discussion of these relocation 
efforts, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 95. Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 351. 
 96. Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10343 (“Participation rates in buyout 
programs have historically been very low.”); NJ Eyes Nearly 700 Homes for Post-
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be strengthened and the process for participating in them streamlined that 
offer some hope of further success.97 For example, several commentators 
have developed creative ways of making buyouts cheaper98 or more 
appealing,99 but these proposals involve paying far less than current 
market price for individuals’ homes or making affordable flood insurance 
conditional on agreeing to a buyout in the event of a future flood. 
Unfortunately, the current political climate offers little reason to expect 
that such measures are likely to win broad support.100 
Most commentators agree that none of the existing measures for 
encouraging retreat are up to the gargantuan task ahead.101 As two scholars 
concluded, “retreat is at present mostly a legal theory.”102 Absent a 
concerted policy, retreat is likely to occur in a scattered, piecemeal fashion, 
as individual residents reach their own tipping points at which coastal living 
is no longer palatable. Atlantic City, one of the many places already 
experiencing the first signs of inundation,103 provides a glimpse of what 
this future might look like. Buffeted by economic problems, the city is 
experiencing a “slow death” at the hands of sea level rise, featuring 
“sporadic super storms[,] routine nuisance flooding, crumbling 
infrastructure, and endemic poverty” as damaged homes are gradually 
                                                                                                             
Sandy Buyouts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.nj.com/news 
/index.ssf/2014/04/nj_eyes_nearly_700_homes_for_post-sandy_buyouts.html  
(noting that officials were not targeting worst-hit, shorefront communities 
because there are “very few willing sellers in these towns”) [https://perma.cc 
/LU4R-X8ZL]. 
 97. Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10343. 
 98. Barnhizer argues for “givings recapture” in the calculation of just 
compensation for condemned property. This would entail reducing a property’s 
market value by the value of the government subsidies the market value implicitly 
includes, such as subsidized flood insurance, flood control structures, and any 
other benefits “directly traceable to past government flood responses.” See 
Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 354–72. 
 99. Hayat and Moore argue that the NFIP should offer homeowners reduced 
flood insurance rates in exchange for a commitment to relocate in the event of a 
serious flood. Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10344–47. 
 100. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10340 (“[The] NFIP, as 
currently implemented, is ill-prepared to deal with the reality that flood risk is 
increasing in response to climate change and that billions of dollars’ worth of 
properties will become uninhabitable by the end of the century.”). 
 102. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268. 
 103. Michael Edison Hayden, Atlantic City Gambles on Rising Seas, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (May 4, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/160 
502-rising-seas-climate-change-atlantic-city/ [https://perma.cc/5UFH-L992]. 
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abandoned, eroding the city’s tax base and making life ever more 
untenable for those left behind.104  
Indeed, retreat policies have so far been implemented almost exclusively 
reactively rather than proactively.105 Thanks to a host of cognitive biases, the 
risk of flooding never appears so great as when a flood has just occurred.106 
The period after disasters also frequently strikes planners and officials as an 
opportune time to revisit things like patterns of settlement and infrastructure 
investments, as recreating the status quo requires an affirmative decision to 
invest.107 The result is that, from a policy perspective, post-disaster retreat can 
appear to be the lowest-hanging fruit. Many experts have offered proposals 
that aim not to move people away from flood zones in tranquil times, but 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id.; see also Virginia Eubanks, My Drowning City Is a Harbinger of 
Climate Slums to Come: Federal Legislation Is Hastening the Collapse of Working 
Class Neighborhoods Near Water, NATION (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.thenation 
.com/article/low-water-mark/ (describing effects of “climate redlining” in Troy, 
New York) [https://perma.cc/L4E9-KHQ2]; Ian Urbina, Perils of Climate Change 
Could Swamp Coastal Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2gj7 
AT6 [https://perma.cc/Z2ED-E78X]. 
 105. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268–69. 
 106. The “availability heuristic” suggests that risks that are easily called to 
mind, perhaps because they have recently been realized, are often overestimated. 
See Meyer, supra note 52, at 158–59. This effect has been observed in studies of 
people’s responses to natural disasters. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, 
Changes in and Generalization of Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences 
with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1992). Indeed, participation in 
the NFIP spikes after floods. Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for 
Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence, 20 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 291, 291 
(2000). Another important cognitive bias affecting perception of disaster risk is 
the tendency to believe that the overall statistical likelihood of an event will be 
represented over a short sample of time, which leads to the underestimation of the 
risk of floods during quiet periods and overestimation during busy periods. Meyer, 
supra note 52, at 160. 
 107. See, e.g., Cite Editorial Committee, A Path Forward to Rebuild Houston 
Post-Harvey, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.houstonchronicle.com 
/opinion/outlook/article/Cite-A-path-forward-to-rebuild-Houston-12168352.php  
(calling for relocation of those who lived in Houston’s flood zones) 
[https://perma.cc/52M9-HU2N]; Judith Browne-Dianis & Anita Sinha, Exiling 
the Poor: The Clash of Redevelopment and Fair Housing in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans, 51 HOW. L.J. 481 (2008) (describing decision to demolish New Orleans’ 
public housing projects in the wake of Hurricane Katrina). 
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rather to put in place mechanisms that will force people to abandon their 
homes in the wake of floods.108 
The trouble with this approach is vividly illustrated by the experience 
of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. As the city’s dramatic failure to 
implement the retreat envisioned by the green dot map shows,109 the period 
after a major flood is one freighted with emotion, and both individual 
victims and the officials who represent them have a tendency to treat 
returning and rebuilding as an act of deep significance. Although some 
victims may react to being flooded with resignation and resettle elsewhere, 
the dominant post-disaster tone is often one of defiance, anger, and 
determination to rebuild.110 In these environments, proposals to mandate 
retreat are often not welcomed, to put it mildly.111 The following Part 
offers a new way of understanding this reaction. 
II. THE IMPULSE TO REBUILD 
What the dominant policy prescriptions ignore is what makes them so 
hard to implement: being flooded in a catastrophic event triggers a set of 
emotional responses that often lead to an intense, frequently adversarial 
desire to rebuild. These responses are complex and usually heavily 
dependent on facts unique to the particular area and storm at issue. 
Nevertheless, the impulse to rebuild can be understood at least in part as 
consisting of a set of sometimes overlapping reactions. First, rebuilding 
can be an act of revenge in roughly the way a tort suit can be an act of 
revenge. Second, rebuilding can be a form of culture, an expression of a 
commitment to a particular way of life and community. Third, rebuilding 
can be an act of resistance in that it defies and undoes the harm resulting 
from governmental failures to prevent flooding. 
                                                                                                             
 108. See, e.g., Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10344–47; Barnhizer, supra 
note 52, at 368; David A. Lewis, The Relocation of Development from Coastal 
Hazards through Publicly Funded Acquisition Programs: Examples and Lessons 
from the Gulf Coast, 5 SEA GRANT L. AND POL’Y J. 98, 100 (2012). 
 109. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., Donze, Let Us Decide, supra note 14; Coral Davenport & 
Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees’, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-the-first-
american-climate-refugees.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/9WFT-GSMG]. 
 111. See infra notes 209–221 
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A. Recovery as Revenge 
Like a tort, a flood causes a disruption in a preexisting normative 
equilibrium, triggering a desire for correction, a need to get even. Getting 
even is not simply retribution—hurting one who has hurt you—but a 
performance that seeks to correct the way in which a wrong affects the 
normative position of its victim. Floods, however, are torts without 
tortfeasors, and this fact changes the way revenge is taken. Instead of forcing 
a tortfeasor to pay his victim, flood victims avenge themselves by 
rebuilding, often reflexively and in a way that is emotionally and rhetorically 
charged. Policies that ignore this aspect of rebuilding in favor of forced 
relocation set themselves up for failure. Just as the tort system provides a 
necessary avenue of recourse in a society that has banned violent retribution, 
the revenge analogy suggests that disaster victims should be provided with 
some avenue of recourse against the storms that have wronged them. 
1. Revenge in Tort Theory 
Scholars have long detected in tort law strong glimmers of the concept 
of revenge. Indeed, tort is often treated as a substitute for revenge.112 In his 
analysis of the mechanism by which tort law substitutes for revenge, Scott 
Hershovitz examines three possible versions of the idea. First, tort law 
might be a kind of bribe, paid by the government to induce people to 
forego the messy and unpleasant business of taking personal vengeance 
against those people who have wronged them.113 A second version of the 
substitution of tort for revenge sees a tort suit as a kind of revenge in and 
of itself. On this account, tort damages are primarily a way of inflicting 
harm on a wrongdoer in the same way as an act of vengeance does.114 A 
third possibility, one espoused by Hershovitz, is that both tort law and 
revenge are tools for accomplishing the same thing: corrective justice.115 
In claiming that tort law is a substitute for revenge because both 
achieve corrective justice, Hershovitz advances a particular version of 
corrective justice, one that differs in significant ways from the classical 
                                                                                                             
 112. See supra note 34. 
 113. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 87 (noting that tort damages are sometimes 
seen as “a payoff to prevent private violence”). 
 114. Id. at 4; Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1387. For Sherwin, the damages 
available in tort law—even those not explicitly labeled “punitive”—frequently 
diverge from what is necessary to compensate the plaintiff and thus can be 
explained only as a way of “provid[ing] satisfaction to the victims of legal 
wrongs.” Id. at 1389. 
 115. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 89. 
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Aristotelian model.116 For Hershovitz, corrective justice is not, per 
Aristotle, about making plaintiffs “whole” by undoing wrongful transactions 
and thus returning them to the position they would have been in had the wrong 
not occurred.117 Instead of the “make whole” metaphor, which he notes is a 
product of the mid-nineteenth century,118 Hershovitz suggests a return to the 
older notion that tort damages offer the plaintiff “satisfaction,” with the 
“animating metaphor” of tort law being “getting even.”119 Instead of 
attempting to restore a preexisting allocation of goods, getting even is about 
restoring an equality of status and social standing.120  
Revenge is also a way of getting even. In revenge cultures, the focus 
was on impermissible behavior and what one party’s treatment of another 
said about their relative positions. As Hershovitz puts it, “you may do unto 
others as they do unto you.”121 Revenge cultures thus did not permit just 
any act of retributive violence against a wrongdoer but rather a particular 
response carefully calibrated to be proportional to the wrong and allow the 
victim to get even.122 Drawing on work by Bill Miller, Hershovitz relates 
some of the workings of the system of lex talionis123 in medieval Iceland.124 
In that society, proportional violent retribution was a backstop designed to 
encourage the payment of compensation to the victim.125 A “plaintiff” got 
even by demanding from a “tortfeasor” the amount of money the tortfeasor 
would be willing to pay to avoid having the same harm inflicted upon 
him.126 If the parties could not agree on the price, they would resort to a 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. at 89–90. 
 117. Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 117 (2011). Hershovitz’s problem with this account is 
that it simply is too far afield from what is practically possible in the vast majority 
of cases. When plaintiffs have suffered any kind of emotional or physical harm, 
awards of money damages do not serve to return them to the status quo ante. In 
fact, they fall so far short of that goal that there must be a different sense in which 
they are doing corrective justice. Id. at 116–17.  
 118. Id. at 118 (citing John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: 
Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 447–62 (2006)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 95. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 122–23. 
 123. Lex Talionis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The law of 
retaliation, under which punishment should be in kind—an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth, and so on—but no more”). 
 124. Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 122–23 (citing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE 
FOR AN EYE 49–51 (2006)). 
 125. Id. at 123. 
 126. Id. 
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neutral third party, the “oddman,” who would render a decision, 
“prevent[ing] getting even from getting out of hand by selling both parties 
on a plausible conception of evenness.”127 
Despite courts’ and commentators’ frequent invocation of the 
“making whole” language, the metaphor of getting even arguably fits more 
comfortably as a descriptive account of our modern tort system. Viewed 
in this light, there are two features of tort law that come into sharp relief. 
First, the adjudication of a tort case is a performance, and the degree to 
which tort suits offer justice is a function of whether the performance is 
successful.128 Second, and relatedly, the success of the tort system in doing 
justice for those who have been wronged is measured by the messages it 
sends. For those scholars who emphasize the role of revenge in tort law, 
the wrongs with which tort concerns itself are not only, or even chiefly, 
about misallocation of goods but also about shifts in the status of the 
parties. A tort that is left unaddressed implies that the tortfeasor may 
permissibly treat his victim in a certain way, lowering the victim’s social 
standing in the community.129 By finding the tortfeasor liable and 
awarding damages, society corrects that message, marking the tortfeasor’s 
treatment of his victim as impermissible and restoring the victim to his 
status as a person deserving of a certain standard of treatment.130 Indeed, 
                                                                                                             
 127. MILLER, supra note 124, at 9. 
 128. Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 125 (“Whether courts succeed in doing 
justice depends on whether people regard the remedies awarded as sufficient to 
render prevailing plaintiffs even.”). Revenge, too, was a performance, one that 
could be effective even when it did not result in the wrongdoer’s injury. In a duel, 
the parties often deliberately fired in such a way as to miss each other, an 
acknowledgement that the public act of each party being vulnerable to the other’s 
deadly force was enough to reestablish their equality, without either of them 
needing to die. See Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and 
Social Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1809 n.113, 1824 
n.156 (2001). 
 129. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 94 (“[T]he threat is to your social standing, 
which is diminished if people think it was okay to treat you that way . . . .”). 
Hershovitz here relies on Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising 
Forgiveness, 62 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 529, 546 
(2001) (“I suggest that a past wrong against you, standing in your history without 
apology, atonement, retribution, punishment, restitution, condemnation, or 
anything else that might recognize it as a wrong, makes a claim. It says, in effect, 
that you can be treated this way, and that such treatment is acceptable.”). 
 130. Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1389 (“[T]he object of compensatory remedies 
is not simply to adjust the absolute position of the claimant, but also to adjust an 
outcome in which the relative positions of the claimant and the wrongdoer are 
deemed to be unfair.”); id. at 1397 (“The outcome of the remedy is not simply a 
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the link between tort law and revenge has led many scholars to see tort law 
as a necessary aspect of government in a society that has outlawed private 
acts of vengeance.131 
2. Against Nature: Revenge in the Disaster Context 
It may seem odd to speak of taking revenge against an unthinking, 
unfeeling meteorological phenomenon of limited duration, such as a 
hurricane. And in a basic sense it is of course true that victims cannot 
inflict harm on natural disasters in retribution for the harm the disasters 
have inflicted on them. There is nevertheless a sense in which the human 
response to natural disasters is characterized by a vehement emotional 
reaction that bears a strong resemblance to certain aspects of revenge. 
Hurricanes are like tortfeasors in that they inflict harm on victims in ways 
that are perceived as unjust. Like torts, these harms are about more than 
just the allocation of losses. They are also about status and equality and 
the particular messages that uncompensated losses send about the status of 
those people who bear them. Lacking an institution like tort law that 
provides an avenue of recourse against the storms that have wronged them, 
disaster victims, like tort victims in the days before the development of 
tort law, are left to take matters into their own hands.132 This they do by 
rebuilding.  
                                                                                                             
correction of loss, but an adjustment in the comparative positions of the parties.”); 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 
MD. L. REV. 364, 369 (2005) (arguing that features of negligence law that can be 
seen as “remnants of primitive notions of vengeance” express values that “link up 
in deep ways to basic principles of liberty and democratic equality” and that by 
empowering individuals to seek redress from those who wrong them, tort law 
“affirms the notion that each of us is equal in owing and being owed various 
obligations by others”). 
 131. See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 541; Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1399; 
Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 
HARV. L. REV. 195, 198–202 (1914).  
 132. Plaintiffs have made various attempts to hold more traditional entities 
responsible for the harms they have experienced in floods exacerbated by climate 
change. Property owners in Mississippi and Alaska have sued fossil fuel companies, 
seeking to hold them responsible for contributing to the harms of hurricanes and sea 
level rise, respectively, but both suits were dismissed. See Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (reinstating district court decision dismissing 
case on standing and political question grounds); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). It is possible that the legal 
system’s inability to assign blame for the harms of such events contributes to the 
sense that nature itself is the only appropriate target of victims’ ire. 
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The rhetoric of revenge is often pervasive in the wake of disasters. 
Public responses by elected officials, media, and victims frequently 
portray storms as “enemies” that “assault” and “attack” their victims, 
leaving in their wake devastation that is often compared to a “war zone.”133 
In New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it was not uncommon 
to see graffiti addressed to Hurricane Katrina itself, often referring to the 
storm as a “bitch” and pledging to return to the city, as if that would 
frustrate the storm.134 Messages of defiance were displayed around the 
city: a popular, locally owned barbershop put a banner above its entrance 
reading “NO SURRENDER! OPEN.”135 Survey data suggests that this 
sentiment was not limited to graffiti. Just over a year after Hurricane 
Katrina, the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted a door-to-door survey 
of more than 1,500 randomly selected people in various parts of New 
Orleans to solicit their views on the impacts of Hurricane Katrina and the 
rebuilding process.136 Seventy-five percent of respondents said that low-
lying areas of the city destroyed by Hurricane Katrina should be rebuilt, 
                                                                                                             
 133. Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 221–25 
(2013). Pidot quotes comments by Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin after 
Hurricane Irene—“I kind of felt like I was coming out of a war zone”—and New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg after Hurricane Sandy—“To describe it as 
looking like pictures we have seen at the end of World War II is not overstating 
it.” Id. at 224. Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Andersen Jones, Disaggregating 
Disasters, 60 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 884, 916 n.157 (2013) (noting remarks by General 
Russell Honore, commander of the federal military response to Hurricane Katrina, 
calling the “hurricane itself  ‘an enemy that pulled a classic military maneuver, 
speeding toward land with overwhelming force.’”); Sarah E. Jenkins, What 
Happens Next: Metaphor in Disaster Recovery Policy, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 151, 
161–62 (2015) (noting Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour’s comparison of 
Hurricane Katrina’s destruction to destruction of Hiroshima and Louisiana 
Governor Kathleen Blanco’s analogy to the reconstruction of Europe after World 
War II in testimony before Congress). 
 134. See, e.g., James Johnson, Aggregates Unseen: Imagining Post-Katrina 
New Orleans, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 659, 664–65 (2012) (“Hey Katrina!! 
That’s all you got? You big sissy!!! We will be back!!!”); id. (“Katrina is a bitch”); 
GETTY IMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/video/new-orleans-resident-
painted-this-katrina-you-bitch-we-news-footage/475166500 (last visited Nov. 12, 
2017) (“Katrina you bitch we will survive.”) [https://perma.cc/5Q7C-KTBN]; 
WORD ON THE STREET, https://wordsonthestreet.files.wordpress.com/2010/10 
/401242171_6a0f404796_b_d.jpg (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“I survived Betsy 
but Katrina was a bitch.”) [https://perma.cc/26G7-CD9N]. 
 135. Campanella, “Bring Your Own Chairs”, supra note 16, at 28. 
 136. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS: 
THE POST-KATRINA BASELINE SURVEY (May 2007), http://kff.org/medicaid/poll-
finding/report-giving-voice-to-the-people-of/ [https://perma.cc/Z3FH-F5C4]. 
2017] STRONGER THAN THE STORM 463 
 
 
 
and 95% said that the region’s levee system should be rebuilt stronger than 
it had been before.137 Eighty-six percent of respondents said they were 
planning to remain in the area.138 
Similar messages appeared after Hurricane Sandy, instructing the storm 
to “shove it”139 and “rot in hell.”140 Indeed, in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Sandy, the state of New Jersey commissioned a series of ads with the slogan 
“Stronger Than The Storm,” which featured shots of the Jersey shore in a 
state of placid normalcy, as well as citizens planting flags with the slogan 
“Stronger Than The Storm” into the sand on pristine beaches.141 In a 
sentiment echoed along the coast, the mayor of Sea Bright, New Jersey, a 
small town on a barrier island that had seen its entire business district wiped 
out and three quarters of its population rendered homeless, immediately 
rejected any suggestion of retreat. “We’re not retreating,” she said: “[i]t is 
antithetical to the [New] Jersey mindset, and particularly to the Sea Bright 
mindset. We’re known for being strong, for being resilient, for not backing 
down.”142  
                                                                                                             
 137. Id. at 5, 25 (asking whether respondents supported rebuilding the levee 
system to withstand a Category 5 hurricane; it had previously been designed to 
withstand only a Category 3 storm). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Jennifer H. Cunningham et al., Hurricane Sandy Starts to Hit: First 
Outages as Rain Arrives and Wind Picks Up in New York City, Streets are Empty 
After Subway Closure, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.ny 
dailynews.com/new-york/gov-mta-suspend-subway-bus-rail-service-article-1.1194 
081 (photograph depicting woman painting graffiti onto her boarded-up house: 
“Shove It Sandy”) [https://perma.cc/QRY4-K64W?safari=1]. 
 140. Ned Berke, Blame Obama for Sandy? Someone Seems to Think So, 
SHEEPSHEAD BITES (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.sheepsheadbites.com/2012/11 /blame 
-obama-for-sandy-someone-seems-to-think-so/ (showing photograph depicting 
graffiti on destroyed wall that said “Rot in Hell Sandy” alongside a drawing of a 
hand with middle finger extended) [https://perma.cc/9554-KK3D]. 
 141. See New Jersey: Stronger than the Storm TV Commercial, supra note 32.  
An official comment accompanying the State’s official YouTube video declares 
that “[w]e’re resilient, we’re Jersey-tough, we are Stronger than the Storm.” Id. 
The ad campaign caused a minor political scandal, as it was funded with federal 
relief money and yet prominently featured Governor Chris Christie, who at the 
time was running for reelection. See Alec MacGillis, The Chris Christie Scandal 
Just Got Worse, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 18, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article 
/117066/christies-stronger-storm-jersey-shore-post-sandy-ad-cover [https://perma 
.cc/TM 6Z-UFYY]. 
 142. Should Worst-Flooded Areas Be Left after Sandy?, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2013/01/should 
_worst-flooded_areas_be.html [https://perma.cc/PYX6-BTJN]. 
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For many people, the rhetoric itself is the problem. On this view, 
treating “nature and humans [as] involved in a conflict in which nature is 
an enemy that must be resisted”143 leads to “a ‘knee-jerk reaction . . . to 
rebuild the same roads and bridges that existed before and bigger, more 
expensive homes.’”144 As in cases of war or terrorism, failing to rebuild 
after disasters thus is rhetorically framed as a failure, a defeat. This makes 
moving out of harm’s way impossible: “The rhetoric of conflict forecloses, 
or at least renders more difficult, decisions to rebuild in more sensible, 
safer locations because, in the narrative of armed conflict, such [a] 
response represents capitulation and retreat.”145 The link between the 
rhetoric and the desire to rebuild seems obvious enough; if disasters are 
the enemy and the enemy wants to destroy people, then it is only natural 
that victims want to resist the enemy by foiling its plans. For those focused 
on rhetoric, the solution is simple: change the rhetoric.146 
Adopting this kind of adversarial personification in the face of 
hardship feels beguilingly natural, and yet it is worth asking why this way 
of thinking and speaking is so common. Why does it occur to victims to 
                                                                                                             
 143. Pidot, supra note 133, at 230; Sun & Jones, supra note 133, at 915 
(“[W]ar rhetoric today plays an increasingly prominent role in the narrative of 
both natural and technological disaster response.”); see also Frederick L. Bates & 
Walter G. Peacock, Disaster and Social Change, in SOCIOLOGY OF DISASTERS: 
CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO DISASTER RESEARCH 291, 291 (Russell R. 
Dynes et al. eds., 1987). 
 144. Pidot, supra note 133, at 234. 
 145. Id. at 235; see also Sun & Jones, supra note 133, at 925 n.210 (“[T]reating 
disasters as a war against nature . . . may encourage society to focus on disaster 
mitigation measures that attempt to control or subjugate nature rather than those 
measures that respect natural forces and try to limit population growth in the most 
dangerous locales.”); Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268 (“Because the 
negative connotations associated with the term ‘retreat’ might make implementing 
these types of policies politically difficult, policymakers may also want to 
consider relabeling it.”). 
 146. See Jenkins, supra note 133, at 151, 176 (arguing for a shift away from 
the metaphor of war and conflict and towards a metaphor of resilience in post-
disaster recovery); Pidot, supra note 133, at 256 (“Political leaders should also 
consider the language they use in discussing disaster . . . . Emphasizing the human 
role in creating circumstances in which natural events can lead to devastation may 
facilitate more rational development policy.”); Sun & Jones, supra note 133, at 
948 (“Now is the time to use this new awareness of the conflation of war and 
disaster to critically assess the tone and language used to convey disaster 
information and policy . . . .”); Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268 (“Because 
the negative connotations associated with the term ‘retreat’ might make 
implementing these types of policies politically difficult, policymakers may also 
want to consider relabeling it.”). 
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refer to weather patterns as autonomous enemies, express a desire to harm 
them, or talk as if rebuilding our homes will represent a kind of victory 
over them? One part of the explanation may simply be that anger is a 
natural reaction to traumatic events, and when trauma is caused by 
disasters, victims’ sense of anger finds its outlet in the unthinking forces 
of nature.147 Another part of the answer lies in the difference between 
revenge as it is typically understood and revenge as a form of corrective 
justice. The point is not so much to inflict pain, or to shift losses, as it is to 
correct the message sent by the wrongful act about the relative status of 
the parties. When people treat hurricanes as enemies and vow to beat them, 
they are not trying to harm the hurricane so much as they are trying to 
repair the harm they have visited upon the victims.148 
Therefore, correcting the harm often involves more than just 
recreating a set of physical goods that existed before the storm. Just as tort 
suits can serve to correct the messages sent by the wrongs that prompt 
them, the act of rebuilding one’s home helps correct a message sent by the 
destruction of a flood. A flood can be an insult, like a tort. Homes were 
destroyed, the flood implies, because they were not worthy of being 
protected, or perhaps because they were constructed poorly or in areas that 
were foolish to inhabit in the first place.149 Perhaps their owners were not 
                                                                                                             
 147. The Department of Veterans Affairs’ National Center for Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder notes that “trauma can be connected with anger in many ways”: 
“After a trauma, you might think that what happened to you was unfair or unjust. 
You might not understand why the event happened and why it happened to you. 
These thoughts can result in intense anger.” Common Reactions After Trauma, 
NAT’L CTR FOR PTSD TRAUMA, U.S. DEPT. OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, https://www 
.ptsd.va.gov/public/problems/common-reactions-after-trauma.asp (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RG8D-2THD]. 
 148. Like corrective justice theorists, those scholars who study disaster 
recovery frequently speak in terms of “repair” and often see rebuilding as an act 
involving repair of more than just physical damage. See Kevin Rozario, Making 
Progress: Disaster Narratives and the Art of Optimism in America, in THE 
RESILIENT CITY: HOW MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM DISASTER 27 (Lawrence 
J. Vale & Thomas J. Campanella eds., 2005) (“When offices, stores, and homes 
are suddenly and unexpectedly annihilated, it is necessary not only to manufacture 
new material structures but also to repair torn cultural fabrics and damaged 
psyches.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Hurricane$, Earthquake$ and Flood$: If 
People Want to Build Their Houses in Dangerous Places, Why Should the Rest of 
Us Pay When Disaster Strikes?, 26 WASH. MONTHLY 10 (1994) (arguing, in the 
wake of the Northridge earthquake, against the idea that “taxpayers [should] 
subsidize Californians and other folks rich enough, lucky enough, or foolish 
enough to live at water’s edge or in the picturesque path of fire, mudslide, or 
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foresighted or resourceful enough to take precautions that would have 
saved their homes or their loved ones.150 The destruction of a flood 
suggests and reinforces all of these narratives. 
Rebuilding, like revenge, counters these messages. By rebuilding, 
victims assert that they are indeed stronger than the storm. They assert that 
they have the fortitude, resources, and self-sufficiency to overcome 
hardship. They assert that their homes, communities, and lives are no less 
worthy of consideration than those of the unharmed and that we all might 
in fact be equal. The alternative—retreat—is indeed a form of defeat. And 
defeat hurts not just because it involves the giving up of a tangible thing—
territory, one’s home—but because it tells the defeated that they are less 
than the victors: less strong, less determined, less resourceful, less 
deserving of respect.151 By rebuilding, individuals complete a narrative arc 
that places disasters in the middle of a redemptive story that ends with 
opportunity and progress, rather than at the end of a tragic story that ends 
with loss and death.152 
The messaging works on the level of community as well. By 
rebuilding, communities insist that they are capable, resilient, resourceful, 
and strong and that they possess these qualities in measures equal to or 
exceeding other, drier communities. All of these ideas are frequently made 
explicit. The narrative of triumphant rebirth has long been a major part of 
the civic consciousness in cities destroyed by disasters. Chicago and San 
                                                                                                             
tremors”); see also M. Justin Davis & T. Nathaniel French, Blaming Victims and 
Survivors: An Analysis of Post-Katrina Print News Coverage, 73 SOUTHERN 
COMMC’N J. 243, 249–51 (2008) (“[N]ews coverage repeatedly presumed that the 
people of New Orleans had detailed, prior knowledge of the dangers that 
hurricanes pose to the Gulf Coast region.”). 
 150. See Karen E. Belinky, Letter to the Editor, Toll of Riding Out Storm, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 25, 2005, at 20A (“Every U.S. News Agency repeatedly told 
residents within reach of the storm that Katrina would likely cause catastrophic 
damage. Yet it appears that through sheer ignorance or foolish bravado, many 
residents . . . decided that mandatory evacuation notices didn’t apply to them. 
Now they’re sitting on rooftops . . . expecting emergency personnel to risk their 
lives to save them. Is this the definition of complete selfishness or simple 
stupidity?”); see also Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: 
Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 462–
68 (2006) (collecting additional examples). 
 151. Alice Fothergill, Enrique G.M. Maestas & JoAnne DeRouen Darlington, 
Race, Ethnicity and Disasters in the United States: A Review of the Literature, 23 
DISASTERS 156, 164 (1999) (“Many minorities had greater difficulties recovering 
[from disasters] due to lower incomes, fewer savings, greater unemployment, less 
insurance, and less access to communication channels and information.”). 
 152. Rozario, supra note 148, at 33–34. 
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Francisco are notable American examples.153 Although modern citizens 
are perhaps less willing to overlook the death toll of disasters in treating 
them as opportunities for new beginnings, the instinct to see recovery as 
an affirmative demonstration of a city’s pluck and grit remains.154 
Just as rebuilding in the wake of disaster conveys a set of corrective 
messages, forbidding rebuilding carries messages of its own. In foreclosing 
rebuilding, the government prevents its citizens from correcting a harm they 
have experienced and prevents them from making the implicit claims about 
equality, self-sufficiency, and autonomy that rebuilding represents. Like an 
insult that stands unwithdrawn and unaddressed, the damage wrought by the 
storm remains. When governments attempt to prevent rebuilding, they are 
asserting, often explicitly, that flooded residents should never have lived 
where they lived, even if they did so for generations. When governments 
close off certain areas, they are signaling that they view those communities 
as a drag on the resources of the broader polity that is not justified by the 
benefit they provide by being there. The implicit message is that 
communities that should not come back are expendable and that the larger 
city, region, or state would be better off without them. 
B. Recovery as Culture 
Rebuilding also expresses certain attitudes about risk and culture, 
attitudes that often strike very deep emotional chords. In work that 
reconceptualizes the ways in which individuals respond to risk, often 
referred to as “cultural cognition theory,” Dan Kahan has identified three 
models for understanding our reactions to the risks we face.155 Under the 
“rational weigher theory,” individuals process information about risk 
dispassionately and then use that information to make utility-maximizing 
decisions.156 The “irrational weigher theory,” by contrast, begins with the 
                                                                                                             
 153. See generally id.  
 154. The cover of the report commissioned by the New York City mayor’s 
office to develop plans for increasing the city’s resiliency in the face of climate 
change contains a definition of “resilient”: “1. Able to bounce back after change 
or adversity. 2. Capable of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from 
difficult conditions. Syn: TOUGH. See also: New York City.” N.Y.C. SPECIAL 
INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT 
NEW YORK 2 (June 11, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report 
.shtml [https://perma.cc/CYS6-RDW7]. 
 155. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 745 
 156. Id. The rational weigher theory, a central feature of neoclassical 
economics, sees no role for emotion in risk cognition, beyond the notion that 
individuals can be risk averse in varying degrees. Id. at 746. Thanks to the 
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premise that people are not capable of accurately evaluating the risks they 
face in everyday life and instead are subject to a variety of emotions and 
cognitive shortcuts that distort their perception of risk in certain 
predictable ways.157 The irrational weigher theory treats these distortions 
as irrational and suboptimal in the sense that they lead people to make 
decisions that they would not make were they in possession of accurate 
assessments of the risks they face.158 
In contrast to the rational and irrational weigher theories, Kahan offers 
the “cultural evaluator theory.”159 Of central importance to the cultural 
evaluator theory is the idea that our responses to risk are expressive rather 
than simply rational or irrational. For Kahan, “when an individual is 
assessing what position to take on a putatively dangerous activity, she is . . . 
not weighing (rationally or irrationally) her expected utility but rather 
evaluating the social meaning of that activity.”160 By selecting which risks to 
engage in, individuals are thus “adopting stances towards states of affairs that 
appropriately express the values that define their identities.”161 Emotions are 
seen not as clouding what might otherwise be rational assessments of risk but 
as “enabling individuals to perceive what stance toward risks coheres with 
their values,”162 which is based on the social meaning of behaviors and is 
“unlikely to be tied in any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those 
risks.”163 
                                                                                                             
contributions of behavioral economics, the rational weigher theory has been largely 
debunked to the extent that it purports to describe the behavior of actual human 
beings. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–85 (1998). 
 157. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 746–48. 
 158. Id. at 748 (“The point,” for the irrational weigher theory, “isn’t merely 
that emotion-pervaded reasoning is less accurate than cooler, calculative 
reasoning; rather it’s that habitual submission to its emotional logic ultimately 
displaces reflective thinking, inducing ‘behavioral responses that depart from 
what individuals view as the best course of action’—or at least would view as best 
if their judgment were not impaired.” (quoting George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk 
as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 271 (2001))). For the irrational weigher 
theory, our responses to risk are a problem; the solution to which is the “delegation 
of regulatory authority to politically insulated, scientifically trained risk experts” 
who are capable of putting in place rules that “form[] [individuals’] conduct to the 
preferences they would hold . . . if they had the cognitive capacity to form 
considered and rational beliefs.” Id. at 761. 
 159. Id. at 748. 
 160. Id. at 749. 
 161. Id. at 748–49. 
 162. Id. at 750. 
 163. Id. at 754. 
2017] STRONGER THAN THE STORM 469 
 
 
 
Cultural cognition theory sees battles over regulatory interventions 
aimed at managing risk not as simple disagreements over optimal social 
policy capable of being resolved by data but rather as fundamental 
conflicts between competing worldviews.164 Debates over gun control 
illustrate the point nicely. Kahan sees those people who generally oppose 
gun control as “individualist[s]” for whom “being rendered defenseless” 
is far worse than simply being exposed to some risk of getting shot.165 Such 
people are, for Kahan, “not so much afraid of dying as afraid of death 
without honor.”166 Opposing groups that do not share the same cultural 
values thus often end up talking past each other when debating the 
appropriate response to risk: “If part of what disturbs (some) people about 
gun control is the condition of servility it expresses to cede protection of 
themselves and their families exclusively to the state,” Kahan asks, “how 
responsive is it to print out a regression analysis that shows more lives are 
saved on net than are lost when handguns are banned?”167 
Cultural cognition theory has important implications for the way in 
which government regulates our exposure to risk. Where the irrational 
weigher theory sees the role of government as stripping emotion out of risk 
perception in the interest of achieving values-neutral, optimally efficient 
social policy, the cultural evaluator theory highlights the problem with this 
approach: in many cases, it forces law to diverge from the deeply held 
normative positions of the citizens it is supposed to govern.168 “If 
individuals’ factual beliefs are expressive of cultural worldviews,” Kahan 
                                                                                                             
 164. Id. at 748–52. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.; see also id. at 757 (noting that people may rationally “care about 
meanings and not just about consequences”). 
 167. Id. at 762; see also id. at 763 (“Part of what motivates [proponents of gun 
control] is an egalitarian and communitarian cultural style that despises the 
individualistic connotations of private gun ownership.”); Dan M. Kahan, The 
Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 134–36 (2007) [hereinafter 
Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State]. It is worth emphasizing that the cultural 
evaluator theory is a way of reframing debates between competing views about 
the desirability of various risks, not an endorsement of one view over another. 
Acknowledging that opponents of gun control are rationally expressing cultural 
values when they take those positions does not mean that they are correct that any 
particular form of gun control should not be adopted. Nor does it place the 
underlying emotions and value judgments beyond debate or contestation. See 
Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 762–63. The theory does, however, 
help resolve debates in that it highlights the often divergent and deeply felt 
normative commitments that underlie opposing views and suggests avenues 
towards reconciling those views. See infra notes 257–261 and accompanying text. 
 168. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, supra note 167, at 118–19. 
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notes, “then experts who treat those beliefs as ‘blunders’ unentitled to 
normative respect in a ‘deliberative democracy’ are necessarily shielding 
regulatory law from citizens’ visions of the good society.”169 The solution 
is not to abandon the project of dispassionate risk analysis but rather to 
frame discussions about risk in ways that affirm rather than denigrate 
individuals’ cultural identities and to frame regulatory solutions as 
expressive of a range of social meanings.170 
Responses to flood risk are also deeply imbued with cultural meaning. 
As with gun control, there are people for whom freedom and individualism 
are defining values that suggest government should not be involved in 
determining which areas are too risky to inhabit.171 Individuals may 
rationally prefer to live in a society that permits them to live where they 
choose in exchange for a very real risk of death or the loss of a home over 
a society that enforces retreat in the interest of protecting life. The 
paternalism inherent in the idea that certain areas should be off limits to 
permanent habitation is usually justified by the fact that the costs of 
flooding are to some degree spread nationally.172 There is certainly a 
tension between claims that property owners have the right to use their 
property as they see fit and the demand that flood insurance be affordable, 
beaches be replenished, or federal relief be provided in the wake of major 
storms. The trouble is that pointing out this inconsistency does not resolve 
the debate, as is true in the numerous other instances in which individuals 
keenly value the freedom to engage in activity that imposes costs on 
others.173 
                                                                                                             
 169. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 761.  
 170. Id. at 765. Kahan refers to these techniques as “cultural identity 
affirmation” and “expressive overdetermination.” Id. 
 171. See Gary Rivlin, Why the Plan to Shrink New Orleans Failed: Revisiting 
the Great Katrina Footprint Debate, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 27, 2015), http://five 
thirtyeight.com/features/why-the-plan-to-shrink-new-orleans-after-katrina-failed/  
(“‘This is America’ was a popular refrain voiced by black and white residents alike 
during the debate over the city’s future. If they had the money, people said, who 
was the government to tell them they couldn’t rebuild?”) [https://perma.cc/2KMK-
8R4D]. 
 172. See, e.g., Editorial: How Federal Flood Insurance Puts Homes at Risk, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2wWxYyk (arguing that buyouts of 
risky properties would save the federal government money) [https://perma.cc 
/9BRW-DSEX]. 
 173. The debate over public health measures to combat obesity often features 
this dynamic. See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Making a Soda Tax More Politically 
Palatable, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2lnHu51 [https://perma.cc 
/6BPK-2AGF]. 
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The degree of flood risk one chooses to accept is also a judgment that 
is in part cultural. It may not even be possible to say that there is a 
particular level of flood risk that is “optimal” in the sense of being purely 
divorced from cultural values and judgments; in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, some people claimed that the entire city of New Orleans should 
be abandoned.174 Deltaic plains have always been flood-prone and yet 
have always been home to some of the world’s largest cities.175 There are 
many instances in which rebuilding after a natural disaster is entirely 
rational.176 No one, for example, thinks that Lisbon should have been 
abandoned after its devastating earthquake in 1755.177  
This problem can be seen on a smaller scale in the ongoing struggle to 
“solve” the problem of what the NFIP refers to as “repetitive loss 
properties.”178 Congress has enacted various reforms over the years in an 
effort to reduce the enormous costs associated with insuring these 
properties.179 The scope of the problem these properties represent is usually 
illustrated by the simplistic comparison of the market value of a home with 
the total value of insurance benefits it has received under the NFIP,180 as if 
a home’s market value was the only relevant measure of its worth.181 
Rising sea levels associated with climate change will affect this calculus 
in many places, but it is not productive to pretend that eliminating flood 
                                                                                                             
 174. See, e.g., Kusky, supra note 9.  
 175. RICHARD CAMPANELLA, DELTA URBANISM: NEW ORLEANS viii (2010) 
[hereinafter CAMPANELLA, DELTA URBANISM]. 
 176. Id. at xiv. 
 177. Instead, the government imposed seismic building codes to help mitigate the 
impact of future earthquakes. See ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 1 (2010). 
 178. Repetitive loss properties are properties that have had two or more flood 
claims of $10,000 or more in ten years. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 46, at 7 (testimony before Congress). 
 179. See RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 32972, FEDERAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE: THE REPETITIVE LOSS PROBLEM (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs 
/misc/RL32972.pdf [https://perma.cc/T975-88T2]. 
 180. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Felicity Barringer & Mary Williams Walsh, Federal 
Flood Insurance Program, Already Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 2012, at A1. 
 181. To be clear, this Article does not argue that repetitive loss properties are 
not a problem that should be addressed. Its quarrel is with the assumption that the 
market value of a home provides a complete account of its worth for the purpose 
of deciding whether or not it is appropriate for anyone to live there. A home may 
have emotional, cultural, or even economic significance that is not fully reflected 
in the price it would fetch on the open market. 
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risk altogether is an attainable—or even desirable—goal. Choosing the 
right level of flood risk requires a turn to culture.182 
Indeed, the cultural valence of attitudes about flood risk is likely to be 
even more pronounced than that of other risks because it is inherently local 
and thus linked to a sense of community.183 Flood risk has been part of the 
culture of southeastern Louisiana for as long as it has been settled by 
humans.184 Traditional regional architecture typically features structures 
that are elevated several feet off the ground.185 Evacuating in the face of 
oncoming hurricanes has been a fact of life for generations. As the response 
to the recent flooding in Baton Rouge has shown, even the process of 
rebuilding after a flood is subject to a kind of cultural normalization, as 
people share knowledge gained after Hurricane Katrina about matters like 
how to remove moldy drywall and apply for grant money from FEMA.186 
These practices are not just adaptations that help minimize risk but also 
indications of the degree to which exposure to flood risk is simply an 
accepted part of the local culture. Another way of looking at this 
                                                                                                             
 182. A turn to culture is often necessary even when there is an objective “right 
answer” to a problem of risk management. Cultural cognition theory emphasizes 
that individual reactions that diverge from objective “answers” should not be 
dismissed as wrong because they are responding to an activity’s cultural valence and 
not statistics concerning its probability of harm. Robert R.M. Verchick, Culture, 
Cognition, and Climate, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 969, 980 (2016). 
 183. Because attitudes toward risk are often culturally determined, they are 
sometimes subject to a kind of groupthink: “insofar as one of the primary sources 
of information people have about the relationship between their values and a 
putatively dangerous activity is what persons who share their commitments think 
about it, perceptions of danger naturally feed upon one another among persons who 
share cultural commitments.” Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 757. 
 184. See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER 
TRAGEDIES: A CENTURY OF UNNATURAL DISASTER 36–37 (2014); CAMPANELLA, 
DELTA URBANISM, supra note 175, at 27–28. 
 185. See PIERCE F. LEWIS, NEW ORLEANS: THE MAKING OF AN URBAN 
LANDSCAPE 64 (2d ed. 2003); Craig E. Colten, Suburban Sprawl and Poor 
Preparation Worsened Flood Damage in Louisiana, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 
22, 2016), http://theconversation.com/suburban-sprawl-and-poor-preparation-
worsened-flood-damage-in-louisiana-64087 (noting that damage associated with 
flooding near Baton Rouge was worsened by newer homes being built on slabs 
rather than elevated above grade like traditional architecture) [https://perma.cc 
/64VV-VC8P]. 
 186. See Campbell Robertson & Alan Blinder, After Baton Rouge Flooding, 
Learning Lessons from New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.ny 
times.com/2016/08/23/us/baton-rouge-flooding-lessons-katrina.html [https://perma 
.cc/ZL7T-NBJ5]. 
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phenomenon emphasizes the costs associated with adopting positions that run 
counter to the interests or dominant cultural values of one’s community.187  
When governments forbid rebuilding, they are picking sides in a battle 
that is inherently cultural while attempting to disguise their actions as 
purely dispassionate risk analyses. Just as debates over gun control involve 
clashing worldviews and thus cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all 
sides by appeals to particular sets of data, debates over the appropriateness 
of forbidding settlement in areas deemed too risky involve competing 
cultural attitudes towards risk and the role of government that cannot be 
resolved by actuarial tables alone. When governments foreclose rebuilding 
in the wake of disasters, they impermissibly ignore the value judgments of 
their own citizens,188 setting up the kind of crisis that occurred in New 
Orleans after the release of the green dot map.189 
Indeed, rebuilding after a storm is expressive not just in the sense that 
it declares support for certain abstract values like individualism but also in 
the sense that it expresses and reinforces membership in a community. For 
many, being a resident of a neighborhood, city, region, or state is a vitally 
important aspect of self-identity. In such cases, returning home after a 
storm represents a refusal to abandon that identity, the way a diehard sports 
fan who refuses to give up on her team after a dismal season strengthens 
her identity as a fan. Rebuilding after a flood thus claims not just the 
myriad positive qualities associated with the ability to rebuild and the 
equality of status with those who were not flooded but also a cultural 
commitment to a particular way of life and a particular region or 
neighborhood. 
                                                                                                             
 187. Verchick, supra note 182, at 980–81. On this view, a resident of a flood-
prone coastal community who favors retreat is something like a Yankees fan 
living in Boston. Id. 
 188. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 761.  
 189. Richard Campanella, a professor of geography at Tulane who at one point 
advised the BNOB, made a similar point during the uproar over the proposal in an 
editorial in the Times-Picayune. Noting that participants in the “great footprint debate” 
could be grouped into warring “philosophies, . . . each with its own logic, passion, 
experts, and dogma,” Campanella argued that individuals’ views on the matter were 
determined by “a tangle of personal, cultural, financial, nostalgic, practical, and 
scientific factors.” Richard Campanella, In Post-Katrina New Orleans: Abandon? 
Maintain? Concede?, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2006 
/04/new_orleans_footprint_katrina.html (last updated May 20, 2015 at 9:49 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/8RSS-54XB]. 
474 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
C. Recovery as Resistance 
Rebuilding after a storm can also be an act of defiance against an 
unfair and discriminatory system. Because flood risk is often correlated 
with race and socioeconomic status,190 and because the harms associated 
with “natural” disasters are often exacerbated by governmental policies 
and actions of one form or another, storms frequently appear to expose and 
exacerbate societal inequalities. Like the victim of a tort who in taking 
revenge attempts to restore an equality of status with a tortfeasor, those 
who rebuild after a storm are in many cases trying to get even, in this case 
with their whiter, wealthier, drier neighbors and with the government that 
seems to have treated them as expendable. 
Storms reinforce an ugly and painful reality about American society: 
we often treat the poor and minorities as less deserving of protection from 
all nature of risks and seem less willing to help when those risks are 
realized. In the month before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans officials 
distributed a DVD in low-income areas of the city, the purpose of which 
“was to let people know New Orleans was too broke to help even the 
infirm or the disabled in the event of a major hurricane. Our main message, 
the DVD’s producer told the Times-Picayune, ‘is that each person is 
primarily responsible for themselves.’”191 The city, along with the state and 
federal governments, then proceeded to prove the truth of this warning. No 
means of evacuation were provided in advance of the storm for those who 
did not own cars—an estimated 100,000 people192—and many of them spent 
several days in appalling conditions at the convention center and the 
                                                                                                             
 190. CHRISTOPHER DALBOM ET AL., COMMUNITY RESETTLEMENT PROSPECTS IN 
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION OF LEGAL, 
CULTURAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF MOVING INDIVIDUALS AND 
COMMUNITIES 3 (2014); Fothergill, Maestas & Darlington, supra note 151, at 161 
(“[D]isaster-connected deaths were disproportionately high among ethnic 
minorities.”). In New Orleans, land that is farther from the river and thus lower in 
elevation was historically much more likely to be inhabited by black people. Craig 
E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in New Orleans, 
1890-1930, 28 J. OF HIST. GEOGRAPHY 237, 237 (2002). 
 191. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 49 (2015). 
 192. STAFF OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE 
PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, FAILURE OF 
INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT 113 (2006). Those living in flooded areas were 
significantly more likely to lack access to a car. BROOKINGS INST., NEW ORLEANS 
AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 13 (Oct. 1, 
2005), https: //www.brookings.edu/research/new-orleans-after-the-storm-lessons-
from-the-past-a-plan-for-the-future [https://perma.cc/2C28-SBYS] [hereinafter 
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE]. 
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Superdome.193 The direct impacts of the storm itself were similarly 
disparate: the homes of 80% of the city’s black population flooded, 
compared with 54% of the city’s white population.194 
For many, Hurricane Katrina was so chilling in part because it 
“exposed” these truths.195 But Hurricane Katrina was certainly not the first 
illustration of these problems. During the catastrophic Mississippi River 
floods of 1927, black refugees were subject to horrific conditions in 
segregated Red Cross camps.196 After Hurricane Frederic made landfall on 
the Gulf Coast in 1979, 33 counties in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida were 
declared disaster areas.197 FEMA “restored power in black communities only 
after it was restored in white areas, and black communities received less 
emergency shelter, ice, food, and assistance than did white communities.”198  
That there was a message in Hurricane Katrina’s devastation was not 
lost on its victims.199 For many people, the storm demonstrated that society 
                                                                                                             
 193. See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 192, at 117–23 (describing 
conditions at the Superdome and convention center and delays in completing 
evacuation). Although much has been written about the conditions at the 
Superdome—the city’s official shelter for those who did not evacuate—and the 
convention center—which became an unofficial shelter for reasons that have 
never been determined, it is worthwhile to be reminded of the basic facts: an 
estimated 19,000 people gathered at the convention center, which had no food, 
water, security personnel, electricity, lighting, air conditioning, or functioning 
toilets. Id. at 118. The Superdome, where roughly 12,000 people gathered, was in 
somewhat better shape: it had food, water, and National Guard troops on hand. Id. 
at 117, 120. 
 194. ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., KATRINA’S WINDOW: 
CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA 2 (Oct. 1, 2005), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/katrinas-window-confronting-concentrated-
poverty-across-america [https://perma.cc/77KB-QTUF]. Notably, black people 
did not make up a disproportionate share of the 818 fatalities in Louisiana for 
which race is recorded. Jonkman et al., supra note 40, at 685. The data, however, 
is incomplete: it covers only two-thirds of the total number of Katrina-related 
fatalities in Louisiana. See id. 
 195. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Storm After the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 
2005, at A23 (“[Floods] expose the underlying power structures, the injustices, 
the patterns of corruption and the unacknowledged inequalities.”). 
 196. KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra note 184, at 70. 
 197. Id. at 167. 
 198. Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW & 
INEQUALITY 297, 298–302 (2007) (describing history of racially disparate 
treatment in disaster recovery). 
 199. Or on Kanye West, who notoriously interrupted a live televised charity 
fundraiser after Hurricane Katrina to declare that “George Bush doesn’t care about 
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regarded them as unworthy of concern or protection. “We were 
abandoned. City officials did nothing to protect us,” one victim testified 
before the bipartisan House committee that was set up to investigate 
governmental actions before and after Hurricane Katrina.200 “We never felt 
so cut off in all our lives.”201 Charmaine Marchand, who represented the 
Lower Ninth Ward in the Louisiana Legislature, noted the widespread 
“perception that the white establishment in New Orleans left its black 
citizens to die.”202 “If it were affluent whites who were flooded and 
stranded on the side of the highway,” Marchand added, “I don’t think 
America would have let them starve.”203 This sentiment was widely held: 
a survey of refugees taken in a shelter in Houston a week and a half after 
the storm found that 68% of evacuees believed that “the federal 
government would have responded more quickly to rescue people trapped 
by floodwaters if more of them had been wealthier and white rather than 
poorer and black.”204 
Although rebuilding might help counter this message, being forbidden 
from rebuilding only makes the message stronger: not only does the 
government not care about residents enough to keep them safe, such 
behavior suggests, it would prefer if they could be simply erased from their 
city altogether.205 During the “footprint debate” in New Orleans, members 
of the city’s white elite spoke openly about the opportunity Hurricane 
Katrina gave them to demographically cleanse the city. Mere weeks after 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall, members of the city’s elite were meeting 
                                                                                                             
black people.” Jon Caramanica, The Education of Kanye West, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
26, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2l2YmSf [https://perma.cc/6892-EK48]. 
 200. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 192, at 6. 
 201. Id. A review of the psychological literature on the impacts of natural 
disasters noted that 
“social class and race contribute[] to residents’ psychological reactions 
to disasters” and described a study showing that “[i]n a small South 
Carolina town, founded on slave labour, the African-American victims 
recalled—in the context of needing assistance from others after the 
storm—their grandparents’ stories of slave days. In particular, they 
recounted how their ancestors were dependent on the white plantation 
masters and slave owners.”  
Fothergill, Maestas & Darlington, supra note 151, at 161–62. 
 202. Frank Etheridge, Last of the Ninth, SALON (Sept. 13, 2005, 8:25 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2005/09/13/ninth [https://perma.cc/NL7T-3VWR]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 136, at 41. 
 205. William P. Quigley, What Katrina Revealed, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
361, 374 (2008) (arguing that the BNOB rebuilding plan indicated that “[p]oor 
and working people are movable, interchangeable, and disposable”). 
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to discuss rebuilding the city with “better services and fewer poor 
people.”206 Although the work of the Urban Planning Commission on the 
footprint question was framed in the race-neutral language of risk and 
sustainability, the effect was the same: one study showed that the 
Commission’s proposal meant closing off the homes of 80% of the city’s 
black population.207  
Again, the message was not lost. After the first public presentation of 
the proposal, the city councilwoman who represented the Lower Ninth 
Ward and most of New Orleans East angrily told reporters that her 
neighbors were “not going to allow themselves to be shoved into the back 
of the bus.”208 When the commission regrouped and released a revised 
version of its plan—in this iteration, a four-month moratorium would be 
placed on building permits in certain neighborhoods, which would be 
converted into “green space” if they did not in that time prove their long-
term viability—the reaction was even more intense.209 At a packed public 
meeting, residents angrily accused the mayor of “taking part in a ‘Katrina 
cleansing’” and attacked the plan for trying to “turn ‘black people’s 
neighborhoods into white people’s parks.’”210 Survey data taken six 
months later showed that more than half of black people in New Orleans 
believed that they “were being given worse treatment and opportunities in 
the rebuilding process than white[] [people].”211 
New Orleans is not the only example of this phenomenon. There is a 
long history of tension arising over post-disaster efforts to increase 
resiliency that are perceived as thinly veiled forms of social engineering. 
After devastating fires in both Chicago and San Francisco, proposals to 
                                                                                                             
 206. Christopher Cooper, Old-Line Families Escape Worst of Flood and Plot 
the Future, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (describing planned meeting of 40 city 
business leaders in Dallas to “begin mapping out a future for the city”). One wealthy 
businessman, James Reiss, was willing to be quoted in the Wall Street Journal, 
explaining that “[t]hose who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it done in a 
completely different way: demographically, geographically and politically . . . . I’m 
not just speaking for myself here. The way we’ve been living is not going to happen 
again, or we’re out.” Id. Reiss was later named to the mayor’s BNOB. RIVLIN, supra 
note 1, at 136; see also GRATZ, supra note 13, at 33–34. 
 207. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 177.  
 208. Id. at 176. 
 209. Id. at 209–15. 
 210. Id. at 214. Marc Morial, the mayor of New Orleans from 1994–2002, 
attended the meeting to offer his own view on the plan: “It’s telling people who 
have lost almost everything that we’re going to take the last vestige of what they 
own.” Id. at 215. 
 211. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 136, at 6, 41. Only 19% of white 
people shared this view. Id. at 4. 
478 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
outlaw wood construction in favor of more fireproof—and more 
expensive—materials were vociferously opposed by poor immigrants, 
who organized sometimes violent protests and complained of class 
discrimination.212 In Chicago, the prohibition on wood construction was 
seen as representing “a de facto denial of the ability of all Chicagoans to 
remain full citizens of their community.”213 “Better a city of shacks owned 
by the people,” a Catholic priest said at a rally in San Francisco, “than a 
city of skyscrapers owned by Eastern capitalists. The extension of the fire 
limits will be our ruin.”214 Both proposed reforms failed.215 
In these circumstances, rebuilding can be an act of resistance. New 
Orleanians who lived in the neighborhoods targeted for elimination by the 
BNOB’s proposal were explicit in expressing this sentiment. At the first 
set of public meetings after the plan was revealed, one resident pledged to 
“sit in my front door with a shotgun.”216 Another resident, referring to the 
fact that New Orleans was one of the few large cities that did not 
experience rioting after the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968,217 
predicted that “[i]f the situation continues to erode, we are going to incite 
people to do what this city never did.”218 At another meeting, a resident of 
the Lower Ninth Ward—a neighborhood slated for conversion into green 
space in the BNOB’s plan—said “that her home would be taken ‘over my 
dead body’” and another warned that “if you come to take our property, 
you better come ready.”219 
It is by no means the case that every flood metes out a larger share of 
damage on minorities and the poor or that the policy of retreat would 
always have a disproportionate impact on already-marginalized groups.220 
                                                                                                             
 212. KAREN SAWISLAK, SMOLDERING CITY: CHICAGOANS AND THE GREAT 
FIRE, 1871–1874, at 145 (1995); Lawrence J. Vale, Restoring Urban Vitality, in 
REBUILDING URBAN PLACES AFTER DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE 
KATRINA 149, 152 (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2006) (noting 
that in San Francisco, “Lower-income homeowners also feared that they would 
not be able to afford to rebuild.”). 
 213. SAWISLAK, supra note 212, at 145. 
 214. Vale, supra note 212, at 152. 
 215. SAWISLAK, supra note 212, at 121; VALE, supra note 212, at 153. 
 216. Donze, Let Us Decide, supra note 14. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Russell & Donze, supra note 12, at A1. 
 220. For example, preliminary reports from Houston seem to indicate that the 
flooding from Hurricane Harvey affected rich and poor alike. See Juliet 
Linderman, Black, White, Rich, Poor: Storm Harvey Didn’t Discriminate, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-
harvey-victims-20170903-story.html [https://perma.cc/XDC8-CFK4]. 
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But when they do, rebuilding takes on a vitally important messaging 
function, an insistence on the value of one’s community in the face of 
those who have neglected it and would apparently prefer to see it 
disappear. This, then, is another factor that helps explain why people often 
feel so keenly the need to rebuild after storms and why governments often 
find it politically impossible to prevent them from doing so. 
D. Other Factors 
In sum, rebuilding can be expressive in a range of ways, all of which 
are vitally important to the victims of major storms. Appreciating this 
leads to new insights into ways in which governments may be able to make 
retreat more politically palatable by providing alternative means of doing 
the expressive work that rebuilding does. Before turning to those 
alternatives in Part III, it is worth pausing here to address a handful of 
counter-arguments that could be levelled at the idea that the difficulty in 
preventing people from rebuilding can be understood by focusing on its 
expressive elements, as well as to add a few caveats.  
To many, the problems that doomed the BNOB’s proposal to forbid 
rebuilding in certain heavily damaged, high-risk neighborhoods were 
largely procedural. Because so many residents of the neighborhoods in 
question were still scattered across the country in the months following the 
storm, few were able to attend the handful of public meetings the Urban 
Planning Commission held to discuss its plan.221 The result was that 
residents felt stunned by the news that they would be forbidden from 
returning to their homes, while the commission was blindsided by the 
wave of opposition that followed the publication of the green dot map on 
the cover of the local newspaper. The importance of the flawed procedure, 
however, only goes so far. It would be wrong to conclude that more and 
better meetings are the answer to the problem of how to make retreat in 
the wake of disasters palatable to the people whose homes have been 
destroyed. The anger expressed by those who faced what would have been 
a second destruction of their neighborhoods did not appear to be triggered 
by a lack of procedure: people complained not only of feeling uninformed 
or being surprised but also of being shut out of their homes and prevented 
from rebuilding their lives.222 The value people place on their homes and 
                                                                                                             
 221. The meetings were largely attended by residents of comparatively dry, 
unharmed neighborhoods, who perhaps unsurprisingly tended to support the idea 
of converting heavily flooded areas into green space. Campanella, A Katrina 
Lexicon, supra note 13, at 29. 
 222. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.  
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the freedom to rebuild them does not seem likely to be extinguished by a 
certain number of meetings. 
Indeed, the Constitution already protects the ability of property 
owners to rebuild after storms through the Takings Clause.223 Forbidding 
a homeowner from returning to, rebuilding, and inhabiting a home 
certainly would constitute a taking and thus trigger an obligation to 
provide compensation.224 No one has ever seriously claimed otherwise, 
and the proposal to close off certain neighborhoods in New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina was always conceded to constitute a taking for which 
compensation would be offered.225 Although the Takings Clause ensures 
a basic level of protection of property rights, it apparently does not make 
retreat acceptable to people.226 The offer of compensation for the forced 
abandonment of neighborhoods did not make the green dot map politically 
palatable in New Orleans. Simply saying that retreat is something that can 
be done constitutionally does not mean that it can be done practically; the 
emotional obstacles remain. 
The issue of eminent domain raises the broader question of the role of 
money in the effort to encourage retreat. The federal government, after all, 
is extraordinarily generous with post-disaster relief funding, at least 
compared with other forms of individual need.227 This extreme 
generosity—Congress appropriated about $120 billion in disaster relief 
                                                                                                             
 223. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 224. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Michelle Krupa, Many Areas Marked for Green Space After Katrina 
Have Rebounded, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 23, 2010), http://s.nola.com/eHSuv0F 
(noting that proposed conversion of neighborhoods to green space was planned to 
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the ability of governments to acquire property by eminent domain during the 
intense nationwide backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City 
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Court’s decision. See Act No. 851, 2006 La. Acts 2957 (amending LA. CONST. 
art. VII § 10); Act No. 859, 2006 La. Acts 2974 (amending LA. CONST. art. I § 4); 
see also Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana Land Reform in the Storm’s Aftermath, 
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(allowing condemnation of private property for, inter alia, “drainage, flood 
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 227. See Landis, supra note 51, at 969–71. 
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after Hurricane Katrina and $60 billion after Hurricane Sandy228—might 
be seen as an adequate response to whatever harm the government causes 
individuals when it enforces retreat in the wake of floods. It is possible, after 
all, that New Orleanians who opposed the closing of their neighborhoods 
simply did not know that they would be entitled to compensation for the 
value of their homes or did not believe that their perpetually cash-starved 
government would be able to honor that obligation. Perhaps governments 
need only compensate their citizens in exchange for forcing them to abandon 
their homes to make the prospect politically palatable. 
There are, however, reasons to think that compensation would not 
make retreat acceptable. Seeing recovery as an act of revenge helps show 
why. The receipt of money from a fund lacks this adversarial element and 
therefore also lacks the sense of correction that rebuilding can provide. For 
many tort theorists, tort law’s insistence on a connection between tortfeasor 
and victim, which is variously referred to as the “bipolar,” “relational,” or 
“bilateral” nature of tort law, has deep normative significance.229 By insisting 
on a connection between tortfeasor and victim, tort law “reflects the normative 
structure of our relationships with one another”230 and thus “is at least 
consistent with the intuition that victims find a satisfaction in pursuing their 
injurers that they would not derive from recourse through a pooled fund.”231 
Receiving disaster aid from a fund in exchange for being forced to move 
elsewhere is akin to receiving compensation that does not come from a 
tortfeasor. It may make the victim “whole” by undoing a certain allocation 
of costs related to an injury, but it does nothing to offer “satisfaction,” to 
assert a right to a certain standard of treatment at the hands of others and 
                                                                                                             
 228. See LINDSAY, supra note 47, at 13. 
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thus help the victim get even. Placing the emphasis on rebuilding as an act 
of cultural expression only heightens the problem further: money does not 
lessen the pain of being forced to abandon a community, a set of values, or a 
way of life. The same is true if the focus is on rebuilding as an act of resistance. 
The fact that the government is willing to offer money in exchange for making 
a resident abandon a home whose destruction it was partly responsible for 
apparently does not do much to lessen the perceived wrong. Money lacks the 
redemptive, cultural, and declaratory power of rebuilding. 
The federal government’s generosity with post-disaster aid further 
supports this view. One leading view is that this generosity reveals something 
about this country’s puritanical attitudes towards poverty: the poor are 
perceived to be lazy while those who are flooded are perceived to be blameless 
victims.232 Another possibility is that the project of post-disaster recovery is 
normatively significant both for individuals and for society more broadly. 
People need the chance to get even after being flooded, and the nation needs 
to demonstrate that it does not allow its citizens to be wiped out by natural 
disasters, that this is a harm that is unacceptable.233 In helping people 
rebuild, governments express a level of respect for their ways of life and 
communities and attempt to undo the perceived wrong in having allowed 
them to flood in the first place. 
To be sure, seeing elements of revenge, culture, and resistance in the act 
of rebuilding one’s home after a storm does not mean that the emotional 
impulses emphasized in this Article are the only, or even the primary, 
reasons local governments find it difficult to move people away from their 
homes in the wake of disasters. Of course, a major—maybe even the 
major—aspect of the desire to rebuild is indeed the desire to recreate an 
allocation of goods—one’s house, for instance—that existed before a 
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disaster. This way of looking at things, however, does not fully capture the 
emotional tenor of the desire to rebuild. If it did, it would not be necessary 
to treat rebuilding as an adversarial process, to speak of being “stronger than 
the storm.” After all, the storm has not gained anything by hurting those 
people affected and is in no position to restore anything to them.234 And if all 
that mattered was correcting an allocation of goods, one might think that 
people would be much more willing to treat their losses as commensurate with 
the various forms of compensation that are frequently offered after major 
disasters. 
There are also numerous other confounding factors at work. Perhaps the 
simplest and most obvious obstacle is cost. The financial burden of 
compensating residential property owners may be prohibitive for many city 
and state governments, although it is worth noting that the federal 
government has made money available to help fund retreat in certain 
circumstances235 and could do so more broadly in the future. 
A related problem is that land use regulation is largely left up to local 
governments.236 Particularly when the costs of floods and other disasters are 
socialized to a significant degree through federally funded engineering 
projects and post-disaster aid, local governments often lack the incentive to 
anticipate and adequately prepare for long-term, complex risks like sea level 
rise. Indeed, in a way New Orleans is actually an unusually easy case, as 
roughly half of the city is above sea level.237 This makes it possible to render 
policy judgments that distinguish between different areas of the city on the 
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basis of flood risk.238 Many smaller coastal municipalities are facing complete 
inundation and thus do not have this luxury.239 
Finally, it is possible that Kahan’s skepticism of the irrational weigher 
model of risk perception is less merited in the context of flood risk. In other 
words, it may be the case that people are actually mistaken about the 
magnitude of the risk they face and that the cognitive biases identified in the 
psychological literature as tending to distort the general perception of disaster 
risk are best characterized as impairments in thinking and not value 
judgments. On the other hand, cognitive biases are much less likely to 
downplay the significance of flood risk in the immediate aftermath of a flood. 
During such times, the “availability heuristic” suggests that individuals are 
likely to overestimate the risk of flooding.240 This is why participation in the 
NFIP spikes after hurricanes.241 
It is important not to overstate the force of any of the myriad factors 
that contribute to individuals’ desire to return and rebuild after floods 
because not everyone comes back. Some people simply are unable to 
return, and others decide they prefer to settle elsewhere. The goal of this 
Article is not to suggest unavoidable psychological imperatives but rather 
to offer a way of understanding a phenomenon. Armed with a deeper 
understanding of why residents feel the need to rebuild, scholars and 
policymakers can see the various ways in which it is problematic for 
governments to prevent residents from doing so and thus begin to think 
about alternative processes that provide some sense of repair without 
putting people right back in harm’s way. 
III. REPAIR WITHOUT REBUILDING 
Appreciating the various emotional aspects of rebuilding leads to new 
insights on how to replicate some of the salve that rebuilding provides without 
allowing people to move back into the same risky places. If by rebuilding 
people implicitly claim a range of positive qualities for themselves, express 
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their commitments to their communities and ways of life, and get even 
with their unaffected peers and the governments who have neglected them, 
then alternatives to rebuilding should strive to accomplish similar ends. 
Although there are no easy answers, governments may be able to achieve 
these goals by conducting adversarial proceedings, preserving and replicating 
communities in new locations, and constructing memorials.242 
A. Suing the Storm 
If rebuilding after a storm can be seen as an act of revenge in the sense 
that a tort suit is an act of revenge, perhaps governments that seek to bar 
rebuilding should consider providing some form of recourse against 
storms, the way governments that have barred revenge have provided tort 
law as an alternative. An important emotional aspect of filing a lawsuit is 
claiming the right to tell one’s story to a representative of the public.243 A 
suit also represents societal concern for the wrong one has suffered, and a 
successful suit helps a plaintiff correct that wrong in various ways.244 It is 
possible to imagine that many of these effects could be achieved by some 
form of adversarial proceeding set up outside the realm of the modern court 
system. Notably, many of these benefits do not depend on the participation of 
a tortfeasor; one can achieve a measure of corrective justice even when 
nobody is available to be cross examined, accept responsibility, or pay 
damages. 
Legal history and indeed the history of tort law in particular is full of 
examples of vengeful impulses directed against non-human entities.245 The 
deodand system in thirteenth-century England allowed those who suffered 
harms to take revenge against the cause of the harm: “If a cart struck and 
injured a victim, the victim was entitled to the cart, not simply for its value, 
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but so that he could avenge himself on the source of the harm.”246 For 
hundreds of years, mostly between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Western Europeans conducted elaborate legal proceedings against animals 
of all kinds.247 In a thoughtful exploration of the practice, William Ewald 
describes a case brought in ecclesiastical court against rats in the town of 
Autun, France.248 A formal complaint was filed, charging the rats with a 
felony for having “eaten and wantonly destroyed some barley crops in the 
jurisdiction,” and a respected local lawyer was appointed to defend 
them.249 The rats failed to appear in court, and their lawyer resorted to a 
series of procedural arguments, eventually succeeding in getting the suit 
dismissed because the rats were never properly given notice of the 
complaint.250 The case made the lawyer famous, earning him “a formidable 
reputation as a criminal defense attorney.”251  
To modern ears, steeped in the values and attitudes of the enlightenment 
and, more recently, legal realism, these proceedings sound fanciful, or even 
insane. For Ewald, this is the very point of talking about them. Ewald was 
interested in asking a broader series of questions about the project of 
comparative law, by illustrating the extreme difficulty of understanding 
the thinking of Western Europeans as recently as 500 years ago. They are 
relevant here for a different reason: not to imply that due process should 
be afforded to hurricanes, but rather to suggest that lawsuits need not have 
any possibility of offering “relief” in the traditional sense to have a 
purpose, and to raise the possibility that perhaps suing a hurricane would 
not be completely insane after all. Indeed, one of the possible explanations 
for the widespread and serious prosecutions of animals that Ewald puts 
forward is that, like deodands, they were intended “to give comfort to the 
soul of the victim” and “to restore calm to a troubled community.”252 
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A useful modern analogy might be the emerging practice of restorative 
justice. Although notoriously hard to define, restorative justice is an 
approach to criminal justice that rejects punitive incarceration in favor of 
some alternative approach, often characterized by a meeting or gathering 
in which victims of crime confront perpetrators of crime in an effort to 
heal the wrong that has occurred.253 There are today at least four major 
strands of restorative justice, each to some degree incompatible with the 
others both in theory and in practice.254 The form most applicable here is 
the “psychotherapeutic” strand, which sees “restoring the victim of a harm 
to a healthful state of psychological well-being [as] the fundamental act of 
restorative justice.”255 Underlying this approach are lessons from the 
psychology of trauma, which sees trauma as the result of “the faltering or 
breaking of protective cognitive assumptions,” calling for recovery via “a 
process of narrative self-empowerment.”256 What is needed, according to 
this subset of the restorative justice literature, is a process that allows victims 
to “rebuild assumptive worlds shaken by the traumatic experience” with 
techniques like truth-telling, empowerment, and narrative.257 
The psychotherapeutic restorative justice literature tends to rely on the 
physical edifice as a metaphor, and the frequent talk of breaking down and 
rebuilding hints at how applicable these ideas are to the context of recovery 
from natural disasters.258 Homes and communities are both crucial aspects 
of people’s cognitive landscapes, and seeing them destroyed often causes 
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trauma.259 Viewed in this light, rebuilding can be part of a process of 
cognitive repair as well as a kind of retribution. Restorative justice suggests 
that proceedings focused on empowering victims through techniques like 
narrative might help lessen the need to use physical rebuilding as a means 
of psychological restoration. 
Perhaps, in the wake of major floods, allowing people to sue the storm 
would have similar effects. Like a French town suing rats for eating its harvest, 
a town destroyed by a flood might find some solace in airing its grievances 
against the unthinking, unfeeling forces of nature. There is certainly value in 
having an opportunity to tell one’s story, and a government that takes the time 
to listen to that story suggests by doing so that what one has to say matters. 
To be clear, this Article does not propose that the court system be enlisted to 
entertain lawsuits filed against hurricanes. But some sort of governmental 
forum dedicated to the gathering of evidence of the impacts of climate 
change would perhaps make a difference. One idea would be to create a 
standing congressional inquiry commission like the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission or the 9/11 Commission, tasked with collecting and recording 
evidence and suggesting remedies on an ongoing basis. Such an institution 
would provide an outlet for the anger people feel towards hurricanes while 
also creating an opportunity for the expressive elements of revenge. 
B. Culture, Relocated 
If rebuilding is expressive of a set of cultural commitments—
individualism, resiliency, and membership in a community—and forbidding 
rebuilding is expressive of a competing set of cultural commitments—
efficiency and harm prevention—disputes over retreat can begin to seem 
intractable. Cultural cognition theory, however, suggests ways in which these 
competing worldviews can be reconciled to reach compromise solutions. Of 
overriding importance is “social meaning overdetermination.”260 Instead of 
trying to drain all cultural meaning out of a particular regulatory approach 
by, for instance, treating it as objectively optimal in light of some set of 
empirical data, cultural cognition theory suggests that we should try to 
pack it full of social meaning so that competing groups can “find their 
values and hence their identities affirmed by it.”261 
Kahan and co-author Donald Braman illustrate these ideas by 
recounting the history of the Native American Graves Protection and 
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Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”), which resolved a bitter dispute over the 
custody of Native American remains between scientists who wanted to 
study them and tribes who wanted their sanctity respected.262 The 
legislation eventually allowed tribes to grant or withhold consent for the 
remains to be retained by museums and anthropologists, thus affirming 
their significance for tribes and the legitimacy of the tribes’ claim to them 
while also allowing scientists to obtain consent and to delay returning the 
items if they play an important role in a particular scientific study.263 
How can measures formulated to implement retreat be designed so that 
they incorporate multiple social meanings and affirm the cultural 
worldview of those who would strongly prefer to remain where they are? 
As with NAGPRA, part of the answer should be to affirm the value of the 
lives people lived in high-risk communities as well as legitimize the values 
that might lead them to oppose governmental efforts to force them out of 
their homes. Adversarial proceedings can have some of this effect, as they 
legitimize the anger people feel toward the forces that have destroyed so 
much of value to them and demonstrate a societal concern for their losses. 
Demonstrating respect for the particular communities at issue can be done 
in a variety of ways, including resettling them intact and memorializing 
them when they are destroyed by storms.264 It is also possible that retreat 
measures could be crafted in such a way as to affirm the attitudes about 
the role of government and individual responsibility that underlie some 
opposition to them. 
1. Resettlement 
One way in which governments may be able to make retreat palatable 
is by moving entire communities essentially intact. This process is known 
as “resettlement,” as distinguished from relocation, which involves 
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individuals moving piecemeal.265 By resettling whole communities, 
governments help counter several of the harms associated with disasters, 
affirming their value in a few senses. Resettling communities necessarily 
implies an appreciation of their worth, in sharp contrast with simply 
outlawing rebuilding, which implies that the larger polity has no need of 
and would be better off without the community in question. Resettling 
communities intact suggests that the connections among members of the 
community, their shared relationships and culture, have value that should 
be preserved. It also serves to counter some of the equality harms 
associated with flooding. Although flooded areas receive the message that 
they are “less than” their drier neighbors—less deserving of protection, 
less able to afford drier locations, less prudent in selecting where to live—
governments that relocate communities send the signal that allowing them 
to flood repeatedly is not acceptable. Resettlement and all the expense and 
attention it entails implies that a community is worth protecting, 
maintaining, and preserving. It is a gesture of respect. 
Resettlement has a spotty record. In May 2016, residents of the tiny 
community of Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana were hailed as the “First 
American Climate Refugees” when they agreed to move away from their 
tiny sliver of land and resettle in an entirely new community farther from 
the coast.266 The community, first settled in the early nineteenth century, 
is composed almost entirely of members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-
Choctaw tribe, and the idea of creating a new community in a safer 
location was important to them: “We consider ourselves lucky because we 
want to put our community together again,” the tribe’s chief said.267 “We 
know that nobody wants to leave, but it’s about staying together.”268 
Although a final site has not yet been chosen, plans call for the construction 
of a new village designed in accordance with traditional tribal architecture 
and with enough capacity to welcome back members of the community who 
have moved away from Isle de Jean Charles in past decades but would like 
to return.269 
Still, the magnitude of the success should not be overstated. The 
community is already little more than a shadow of its former self. It has lost 
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98% of its land since 1955, and its population has already dwindled from 
a peak of 400 residents to about 85 residents.270 The only road to the 
community routinely floods, cutting it off completely from the outside 
world, and many homes have already been destroyed by hurricanes.271 
Meanwhile, the idea of resettling the town has been debated for well over 
a decade; residents voted against similar proposals in 2002 and 2009.272 
Even the current decision does not require residents to leave, and several 
insist that they will remain where they are.273 The cost of resettlement is 
also a concern. The project is funded by a federal grant of $48 million to 
resettle less than 100 people, far more than it would cost to condemn all 
the property in the town.274 
Although Isle de Jean Charles may be the first community resettled 
because of climate change, it is not the first community that has been 
moved to avoid floods. In 1978, the entire town of Allenville, Arizona was 
moved after disastrous flooding.275 So was Valmeyer, Illinois, which was 
flooded by the Mississippi River in 1993 and subsequently relocated atop 
a bluff two miles away.276 In both cases the resettlement was made possible 
by federal funding, and in both cases the resettled communities were 
located in rural areas and were able to move to higher ground nearby.277 
Notably, not all of the communities that were flooded in 1993 relocated like 
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Valmeyer. Chesterfield, Missouri experienced a post-flood development 
boom.278 
Given this history, it is hard to see resettlement as a scalable solution 
to the problem of rising seas. Even tiny, close-knit communities facing 
already-dire loss of land have had trouble agreeing to move. The cost of 
constructing new communities is also high and it is likely to be more 
feasible in some areas than in others. Finding a site for the new community 
of Isle de Jean Charles in rural southern Louisiana may not be an 
insurmountable obstacle; it is harder to know where communities along 
the more densely populated East Coast, like Tangier Island in Chesapeake 
Bay, could be placed. It is also difficult to know how resettlement could 
be applied to urban areas like New Orleans or Miami. 
Still, resettlement should be thought of as one of the tools governments 
can use to foster politically palatable retreat, at least in certain limited 
circumstances. From the perspective of residents, resettlement is preferable 
because of the continuity it offers and the values it conveys.279 From the 
perspective of governments, it presents a way of moving constituents to 
safety without losing them altogether.280 But the national scope of the 
problem will require more tools. 
2. Memorials 
When governments cannot feasibly resettle communities wholesale, 
they may have to consider other ways of providing some of the emotional 
salve of rebuilding while enforcing a policy of retreat. Memorials can be 
a form of social meaning overdetermination in that they provide 
affirmation of the value of victims’ communities and ways of life. This 
affirmation could make some form of retreat more palatable. Memorials 
can be powerful expressions of societal judgment about important events. 
By honoring the dead, memorials demonstrate the value of lives lost and 
the merits of the cause for which they perished, or the unacceptability of 
the cause of their death. There is no national memorial to the victims of 
traffic accidents, of which there are about 30,000 every year, but the names 
of the roughly 3,000 victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks are etched in 
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bronze at a memorial located on the spot where most of them died.281 This 
is because society views the risk of dying in a car crash as an acceptable 
fact of modern life, worth the gains in time and convenience from driving 
around in cars, but the risk of even a single American dying in a terrorist 
attack is regarded as unacceptable.282 The message is not quite that victims 
did not die in vain, which Americans are often inclined to say about those 
who die fighting in wars, but that their deaths will be marked off as distinct 
from all other deaths, uniquely wrong and uniquely unacceptable.283 In this 
sense, a memorial can also be seen as an act of revenge, or at least part of 
a process of revenge.284 Like violent revenge, memorials mark what 
occurred as wrong and thereby elevate those who were wronged, restoring 
a measure of status when there is no way to restore the most important 
loss: a life. 
On a less theoretical level, the 9/11 memorial provides a good 
illustration of the level of society’s concern for the victims and the way in 
which their deaths will be remembered. The debate over whether and how 
to rebuild the Twin Towers began almost as soon as they were destroyed.285 
The office buildings that would replace the World Trade Center and the 
memorial that would honor the victims were the subject of international 
design competitions, which drew entries from all over the world.286 The 
memorial eventually included the names of all the victims, listed not 
alphabetically but according to “meaningful adjacencies” designed to 
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capture the real-life connections between the dead. The adjacencies were 
determined partially by an algorithm designed for the purpose and also in 
response to some 1,200 individual requests, all of which were 
accommodated.287 
There is, by contrast, no national memorial to the victims of Hurricane 
Katrina. The city of New Orleans’s official Hurricane Katrina memorial is 
located in a cemetery.288 Designed by a local coroner, it holds the bodies 
of about 80 people whose remains were either unidentified or unclaimed 
after the storm.289 In the center is a simple granite plaque bearing a few 
paragraphs of information about the storm.290 On a neutral ground in the 
Lower Ninth Ward, another memorial consists of vertical blue pillars 
marking the depth of floodwaters.291 Some memorials have been more 
pointed in assigning responsibility for the flooding. Standing in the water 
in the middle of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel 
created by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1965 that helped funnel 
Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge into New Orleans, is a large, elaborately 
decorated metal cross.292 A local non-profit formed after the storm to 
advocate for stronger levees is in the process of installing a series of 
historical markers at the site of various levee breaches. The non-profit’s 
first marker, at the 17th Street Canal, is pointed in its criticism of the 
Corps.293 Whatever one might say about the various Hurricane Katrina 
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memorials that currently exist, it is clear that they do not represent a kind 
of national accounting in the way the 9/11 memorial does. 
Would a more concerted effort at memorialization in the wake of 
natural disasters help create a sense of repair for victims, lessening the 
drive to rebuild? There is reason to think so.294 If opposition to retreat is 
partially driven by the disrespect it expresses toward a community or way 
of life, then memorialization can act as a powerful counterweight. 
Memorials like those constructed after wars can also help cast losses as 
tragically permanent alterations in our lives rather than temporary setbacks 
to be overcome. Undertaking this effort might mean establishing memorials 
to the victims of particular disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. It might 
also mean building a national memorial to those displaced by climate 
change.295 
Of course, it is hard to make the strong causal claim that a Hurricane 
Katrina memorial would have made some discrete number of individuals 
willing to relocate rather than rebuild. The power of memorials lies in their 
ability to help shape the way a culture responds to loss. Post-flood 
memorials could thus be one tool, along with rhetorical strategies like not 
personifying hurricanes and renaming “retreat,” in the broader, nascent 
effort to reshape our cultural response to catastrophic floods. What is 
needed is a normalization of the idea that some coastal areas will disappear 
and that nothing can be done to save them. Using the cultural tools often 
brought to bear in the wake of tragedy might help further this vitally 
important project. 
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C. Resistance, Redirected 
If rebuilding is in some circumstances an act of resistance against 
governmental neglect, endangerment, and eviction, then it can begin to look 
like a form of false consciousness. Flood victims who insist on rebuilding 
in defiance of governmental efforts to get them to leave may express anger 
towards the storms that destroyed their homes and the government that 
would like to keep them from coming home, but rebuilding often simply 
recreates the risk that harmed them in the first place. Anger could more 
productively be directed at holding the government to account. 
Unfortunately, sovereign immunity almost entirely forecloses lawsuits 
against the federal government for causing or contributing to the harms 
associated with floods. The Flood Control Act of 1928 indemnifies the federal 
government for flood damage related to the construction of levees, no matter 
how negligent.296 Plaintiffs in New Orleans appeared to have found a way 
around this bar when they sued the Corps of Engineers for negligently 
maintaining the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation canal, rather than 
a flood control structure, which was found to have funneled Hurricane 
Katrina’s storm surge into the city and thus contributed to the flooding.297 
Nevertheless, the negligent maintenance of the canal was eventually held to 
fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, barring the plaintiffs’ case as a matter of sovereign immunity.298 The 
various shortcomings in the federal government’s response to the storm 
would seem to enjoy the same protection.299 
Setting aside sovereign immunity for the harms associated with flood 
damage—in addition to helping make victims whole financially—would 
provide a forum in which victims’ anger could be channeled against the 
government for failing to keep them safe rather than for trying to make 
them safer by moving them to less risky areas. Lawsuits that aim to assign 
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responsibility for flood damage to particular governmental policies also 
highlight the government’s shortcomings, shaping public discourse even 
when they do not succeed in court.300 They might thus help victims shift 
their focus away from needing to claim a victory over the forces of nature 
by rebuilding and toward seeking a victory over those human actors who 
have contributed to the risk they face in a variety of ways. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States faces a staggering task over the next century: managing 
the inundation of the homes of between 4 and 13 million people.301 Even 
though the effects of sea level rise are already beginning to be felt, there has 
so far been no implementation of a policy of retreat at any meaningful scale. 
One of the key obstacles standing in the way of safer housing patterns is the 
intense desire to rebuild in the wake of major floods. Understanding and 
addressing the roots of this impulse is of crucial importance if regulatory 
approaches to retreat are to be implemented successfully. Although there is 
no single analysis that applies to every individual in every situation, the 
impulse to rebuild can be seen as a form of revenge, culture, and resistance. 
Appreciating these aspects of rebuilding highlights the importance of the 
various messages it sends and suggests ways in which those same restorative 
messages might be sent without helping people move right back to the water’s 
edge.  
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